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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has been defined as an informal procedure used by
disputants to resolve their differences in a forum other than a court of
law.' By agreeing to arbitration, the parties submit their disputes to
selected arbitrators, whose reasoning and final decisions or awards
supplant the judgment of the established judicial tribunals! Further, the
decisions of arbitrators are usually binding and enforceable in courts.3
Although arbitration has been lauded for being less expensive and time-
consuming than litigation,4 consumers arbitrating disputes with large
companies may not be playing on a level field.'
It is important, however, to distinguish arbitration from mediation.
Arbitrators, unlike mediators, are given the power to resolve the dispute
before them and to force, if necessary, settlement upon the parties.6
1. See STEPHENB. GOLDBERG ETAL., DISPUTE RESOLuION: NEG TIATIoN, MEIATIoN,
AND OTHER PROCESSEs 199-211 (2d ed. 1992), cited In Darrien 0. Shuquem, Note, Moore v.
Conliffe: Has the California Supreme Court Sanctioned Perjury in Private Arbitration?, 30 U.S.F.
L. REv. 861, 862 n.8 (1996).
2. See Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interitate Commerce
Requirement: What's Leftfor State Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L REV. 385, 388 n.1 1 (1992)
(quoting Castle-Curtis Arbitration, 64 Conn. 501 (1894) (other citations omitted)).
3. See id at 389; see also United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1995); Maine
Uniform Arbitration Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 5927 (West 1980) (staling that arbitration
agreements are "enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract").
4. See, eg., Anne Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts ofAdheson:
Fair Play or Trap for the Weak and Unwary?. 21 J. CORP. L 331,333 (1996) ("Many consumer
disputes... can be resolved quickly and relatively cheaply through arbitration."); Paul M. Barrett,
High Court to Consider Validity of State Shield on Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1996, at B6
("[B]usinesses in many fields, especially the securities industry, have pushed arbitration as a less
costly alternative for resolving disagreements with customers and employees."); What Price
Justice? (A Survey of the Legal Profession), ECONOMfsT, July 18, 1992, at 17 (Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) "dispenses with formality and cumbersome procedures and aims to settle cases
faster than, but just as fairly as, normal courts."). But cf Id ("ADR is no magic solution. In some
of its forms it is as expensive as traditional litigation."). Note that arbitration is a subclass of ADR.
See discussion infia accompanying notes 6-7.
5. See discussion infa Part IV; see also Bany Meier, In Fine Prin4 Customers Lose Ability
to Sue, N.Y. TiMiEs, Mar. 10, 1997, at Al (Consumer advocates contend that arbitration "is fostering
a system of private justice that conceals wrongdoing from public scrutiny, unlike a trial where
allegations are made and rebutted in the open."); Order in the Tort (A Survey of the Legal
Profession), ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 8 ("Increasingly, businesses are simply... hiring retired
judges to rule on disputes. The drawback of'rent-a-judge' for the public ... is that cases are
confidential, so controversial goings-on can be kept secret.").
6. See Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative
Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L REV. 885. 889 (1997).
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Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), meanwhile, is a term that
subsumes both arbitration and mediation, as well as neutral evaluation,
settlement conferences, and the use of special masters, minitrials, and
summary jury trials.7 Discussions and criticisms in this Comment focus
only upon arbitration, emphasizing the use by financial institutions of
that form of ADR to resolve disputes arising subsequent to their
customers' execution of an arbitration agreement.
Arbitration is not a modem innovation. It has been utilized since
biblical times.' By the nineteenth century, arbitration in Europe, and
later in the United States, came to be seen as "a bastard remedy,
incapable of being integrated into the self-respecting family of
adjudication."9 In England, arbitration lacked finality because courts
could completely revise an arbitrator's ruling on any legal question
arising in the course of the arbitration.'0 Whether at law or in equity,
English courts would not compel parties to perform existing arbitration
agreements." This distrust of arbitration was imported into the United
States, where courts declined to give binding effect to arbitration
agreements until the arbitrator had afforded relief.2 In spite of this
widespread distrust, the process served a vital function for merchants
seeking to resolve disputes expeditiously before a tribunal with the
requisite expertise in commercial dealings. 3
7. See Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on
Implementation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1303, 1330 (1994).
8. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process In American
Law, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1945, 1947 (1996) (focusing on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "the
formative period of modern legal systems").
9. Id.
10. See id. at 1948.
11. See Shirley A- Wiegand, Arbitration Clauses: The Good, the Bad, the Ugly, 47 OKLA.
L. REv. 619, 620 (1994) (citing Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass, 1845)
(No. 14065)).
12. See Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1949. Courts, at least until the early twentieth century,
guarded their jurisdiction jealously, in order to preserve "[t]he normative function of law, as a guide
through society's conflictual relationships." Id This "normative function" is neglected in the
arbitral process today, at least in the context of consumer arbitration. See, e.g., Bruce E. Alexander,
The Arbitration of Disputes With Consumers: Some Practical Pointers, 936 PRACTIsINo LAW INST.
CORP. LAW AND PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 893, 915 (1996) (advising drafters of arbitration
agreements to specify whether applicable law is to be followed by the arbitrator or whether the
arbitrator may simply "apply his/her personal sense of fairness and equity" and ignore the law). For
a concise study tracing the Supreme Court's transition from "overt hostility to warm receptivity"
of arbitration, see Wiegand, supra note 11, at 619, 622-27, and infra text at Part II.B.
13. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 88
(1992) (explaining that, with the growth of private arbitration, the demand for experts has come to
exceed substantially the supply, and today's arbitrators, unlike those available to textile merchants,
are often non-experts); see also id at 88 n.30 ("Arbitrators can easily be appointed to panels merely
by filing forms listing their experience. While arbitral organizations, in theory, review these forms
for legitimacy, no thorough assessment or test of the arbitrator's knowledge of the substantive law
of the specialty is conducted.").
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In the early part of this century, courts, eager to preserve their
jurisdiction, often refused to enforce arbitration agreements. 4 At the
same time, fair resolution of commercial disputes may have required
expertise in analyzing the underlying transactions. 5 Arguably, the need
for experts familiar with commercial practices increased in proportion
to the complexity of commercial transactions. Even the most qualified
ofjudges recognized the need for experts to assist the courts in resolving
disputes among merchants.1 6 Nonetheless, the courts remained
suspicious of arbitration in general and continued to invalidate
agreements. 7
To counter the courts' tendency to invalidate predispute arbitration
agreements, 8 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act 9 (FAA) in
1925. Apparently, the narrow purpose of this Act was "to give the
merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it."2 Thus,
arbitration originally served the limited purpose of providing expert
adjudication of disputes among consenting merchants of presumed equal
14. See Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice Through Binding Arbitration of Future
DisRputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Umary Consumer?, 5 LoY. CO.NSIUMR L
REP. 112,116 (1993).
15. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 2, at 388 (CMerchants and commercial interests have
used arbitration to resolve disputes for centuries. Indeed, nearly all business disputes in England
were decided by arbitration up to the time of Lord Mansfield [1705-17931.") (footnotes omitted).
16. See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND ThE JUDGE 136-45 (1994).
Among his many other distinguishing attributes, Learned Hand achieved the "reputation as one of
the nation's great patentjudges." lI at 138. Learned Hand debated the virtues of employing court-
appointed experts even as he himself became well known for his expertise in cases "'covering
almost every subject in the legal lexicon.'" Id at 145 (quoting Henry J. Friendly, LearnedHand:
An Expressionfrom the Second Circuit, 29 BROOK. L REv. 6. 13 (1962)). At the same time, he
adhered to a doctrine ofjudicial restraint. A system of arbitration wherein the arbitrator can appeal
only to his/her sense of fair dealing and ignore the law would have been undesirable in many
contexts;judges who decided vhether a particular legislative purpose w legitimate "exceeded their
legitimate powers unless they deferred to elected legislatures on debatable issues." fd at 122. It
is hard to imagine Judge Hand not applying the same rigorous standard to arbitrators. See also
Brunet, supra note 13, at 117 (pointing to Julius Cohen's view of the FAA legislation he had drafted
"as not setting forth a 'proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes,' subjects he felt er= 'better left to
the determination of skilled judges'") (quoting Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New
FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L REV. 265,281 (1926)). Finally, it is interesting to note that the
State of New York has created a commercial court, called the "Commercial Division," which began
operating on November 6, 1995. See Robert L Haig, New York Creates Business Courts, Bus.
LAWTODAY, SeptJOct. 1996, at33, 34.
17. See Green, supra note 14, at 116.
18. See id
19. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(1995)).
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,39 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomn. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923)).
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bargaining power, and Congress enacted the FAA to counteract judicial
hostility toward that form of arbitration.2
At the time of its passage, the FAA was viewed as a simple
declaration of the new federal policy recognizing and enforcing
agreements to arbitrate disputes among merchants.' Further, the FAA
was not to "encroach upon the province of the individual States."23 By
1996, however, the FAA was held to preempt state disclosure laws
enacted to ensure that arbitration clauses contained in contracts be
brought to the attention of all signatories.24
This Comment assumes that consumers, overall, benefit from these
disclosure laws, whereas lenders and merchants find them cumbersome,
due to the significant paperwork they must generate to remain in
compliance. The Author argues that lenders have as many reasons to
favor arbitration as consumers have to fear this method of resolving
post-closing, consumer-lender disputes. Preemption of laws requiring
heightened disclosure of arbitration clauses is good news for lenders but
detrimental to the interests of consumers for reasons that are enumerated
later in this Comment.25
Part 11 considers the effect of recent United States Supreme Court
decisions on certain state disclosure laws, with primary focus on the
Maine Plain Language Law26 (Maine PLL). Part HI begins by tracing the
development of arbitration under the FAA and the Maine Uniform
Arbitration Act (Maine UAA). Next, several Supreme Court cases
construing the FAA are outlined, with specific emphasis on the Court's
recent decision in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto." Part II
concludes with the proposition that although Casarotto displaced some
consumer protection laws, it did not impact the Maine PLL negatively.
21. One commentary presents evidence that the FAA was an attempt "to devise a remedy
entirely for commercial disputes." Brunet, supra note 13, at 117 (explaining Cohen & Dayton,
supra note 16, at 281). The Supreme Court has "glossed over" the legislative history of the FAA
"as it pertains to bargaining power." Green, supra note 14, at 116 (citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). The majority in recent
Supreme Court cases has repeatedly failed to take account of this legislative intent. By doing so,
it may have "put to one side any concern about the inequality of bargaining power between an entire
industry, on the one hand, and an individual customer . .. on the other." Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. See Cohen & Dayton, supra note 16, at 277.
23. Id
24. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (invalidating MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995), which provided that an arbitration clause would not be enforced unless
notice of it was provided on the first page of the contract).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.
26. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 10, §§ 1121-1126 (West 1997). This law requires supervised
lenders and lessors doing business in Maine to disclose contract terms to consumers in a
straightforward manner, in "plain language."
27. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West 1980).
28. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (invalidating state laws that require heightened disclosure of
arbitration clauses).
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Part H demonstrates why the Maine PLL was not displaced by the
Supreme Court's decision in Casarotto. This Author specifically
advocates amending the Maine PLL to require financial institutions to
warn consumers of the practical effect of signing predispute arbitration
clauses and contracts.29 Amending the Maine PLL would serve a dual
purpose: first, it would be an effective way to regulate growing lender
reliance on arbitration clauses without facing preemption under
Casarotto; second, it would serve to preserve the substantial rights" of
the populace without disturbing the considerable body of Maine law
governing labor-related disputes.3
Part IV examines the reasons why heightened disclosure of arbitration
clauses is desirable. Consumers are often disfavored under current
arbitration proceedings because financial institutions have every
incentive to impose agreements to arbitrate upon their customers without
allowing for any negotiation 2 This problem might be alleviated, and
the playing field levelled, were the Maine Legislature to adopt the
amendments to the Maine PLL proposed in this Comment.
Part V considers other potential means of protecting the interests of
consumers who find themselves before an arbitrator. Most notably, this
Author argues that arbitrators hearing disputes between consumers and
lenders should be required to follow consumer protection law, which is
not currently the practice. This Comment concludes with a brief
29. Part Ill also suggests that amendments to the Maine UAA might be warranted. For
example, courts might be empowered to stay arbitration upon a showing that the disclosure
requirements of the newly amended Maine PLL were not met. See discussion Infra Part 1I.B.
30. For example, the Maine Consumer Credit Regulation Office (MOCC) is concerned that
consumers are unknowingly waiving important statutory rights including the right to contact that
office in order to pursue complaints against lenders. See discussion infra Part IV.B. More
important, by signing arbitration agreements, consumers are giving up the right to trial byjury and
the right to redress for injuries. See ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 19-20. Meanwhile, where small amounts
are in dispute, consumers are foregoing the right to litigate in small claims court, which is often
quicker, less expensive, and more efficient than arbitration. See IE. R. SMALL CL P. 3(d), 15
(setting claim limit at $3,000, and indicating that purpose of Small Claims Court Act was "to
provide 'a simple, speedy and informal court procedure for the resolution of small claims'").
31. This Author does not contend either that arbitration conducted pursuant to collective
bargaining agreements is inherently unfair, or that Maine courts have -ATongly enforced those
agreements; on the contrary, union members and employers are both "repeat players," so there is
less likelihood that the arbitrator desiring future employment will favor one party over the other,
especially when an ongoing relationship needs to be preserved. There is little need to disclose the
terms of these agreements in as conspicuous a manner as is needed in the consumer context, because
union representatives are often available to explain (and enforce) the terms of these agreements.
Arbitrators resolving disputes that arise from transactions between major financial institutions and
single borrowers, however, often encounter no need to preserve the relationship, because the lender
is the only "repeat player" that will employ (or not employ) the arbitrator again in the future. See
Brunet, supra note 13, at 91, 118-19.
32. Arbitrators have an interest in avoiding decisions adverse to the lenders that employ
them on repeated occasions. Similarly, arbitrators have little incentive to favor consumers, %ho are
only "one-shot" players in the process. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between
Consumers and Financial Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 01o10 ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL 267 (1995).
MAINE LA WREVIEW
overview of potential responses by Maine courts,33 as well as legislative
solutions.
II. ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN MAINE
A. The Role of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Maine Uniform
Arbitration Act
After its passage by Congress in 1925, the FAA was reenacted and
codified as Title 9 of the United States Code in 1947."4 Maritime
transactions, transactions "involving commerce," and contracts arising
therefrom were made subject to the Act and were to be "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."3 The FAA further
provides that the courts of the United States may order a stay ofjudicial
proceedings upon a showing that "the issue involved in [the] suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under [an arbitration]
agreement .... ,36
Julius Cohen, a leading member of the American Bar Association and
the "initial drafter of the FAA, '37 published his interpretation of the Act
one month after its effective date.38 Cohen pointed out that "[tihe
primary purpose of the statute [was] to make enforceable in Federal
courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress
rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the
Federal courts., 39 As later argued by Justice O'Connor, the intent of
Congress "was to create uniform law binding only in the federal
courts."4 ' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in a line of cases
culminating in the 1995 decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson,4 has held that the FAA preempts certain state laws drafted to
33. Maine courts may rely, for example, on the public policy exceptions articulated in both
Supreme Court and Maine cases, and on the Maine Constitution. See ME. CONST. art. 1, § 19
("Right of redress for injuries").
34. Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994)). See also Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 669 (reenacting and
making positive law the 1925 Arbitration Act).
35. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
36. Id § 3.
37. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 116. See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 274 (1995) (noting that Cohen was "the drafter for the American Bar Association of much
of the proposed bill's language").
38. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 116 (citing Cohen & Dayton, supra note 16, at 265).
39. Cohen & Dayton, supra note 16, at 277-78 (emphasis added).
40. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. 513 U.S. 265 (1995). The Court discussed cases anticipating Keating, where the Court
held that Congress could not possibly "have wanted state and federal courts to reach different
outcomes about the validity of arbitration in similar cases." Id. at 271. Therefore, the Court in
Dobson held that the "involving commerce" language of section 2 of the FAA "signal[led] an intent
to exercise Congress's commerce power to the full." Id. at 276. Any state antiarbitration law or
policy would now be preempted. See id. at 274.
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protect consumers from "adhesive" '4 arbitration agreements' The
Court reasoned that it could not sanction any attempt by a state to
"carv[e] out an important statutory niche in which [it] remains free to
apply its antiarbitration law or policy."
Dobson set the stage for the invalidation of state disclosure laws
enacted to protect consumers from arbitration clauses hidden in fine
print within the many pages of standardized contracts. One year later,
the Supreme Court struck down a Montana statute' which provided that
arbitration clauses would be invalidated unless the contract containing
the clause indicated on the first page that it was subject to arbitration 6
Because the disclosure requirement was "not applicable to contracts
generally," the FAA was held to displace the Montana law, based on the
reasoning that "[c]ourts may not.., invalidate arbitration agreements
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.'47
States, meanwhile, have their own arbitration acts. Maine first
adopted the Maine UAA in 1967.48 Section 5927 reads as follows:
Validity of arbitration agreement: A written agreement to submit any
existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract
to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This
chapter also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees or between their respective representatives, unless
otherwise provided in the agreement.49
The Maine UAA and the FAA are thus very similar. The operative
language contained in both section 2 of the FAA and section 5927 of the
Maine UAA is identical: each provides that predispute arbitration
agreements shall be "valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."5
42. "Adhesion contracts" have been defined as agreements offered on a"take-it-or-lcave-it"
basis, -aiere there is no room for negotiation-the party ,who must adhere either signs the agreement
or goes elsewhere. See Green, supra note 14, at 120 n.5.
43. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272-73.
44. Id at 273.
45. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995), wchich provided: "Notice that a contract
is subject to arbitration ... shall be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the
contract; and unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."
46. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. CL 1652, 1656 (1996).
47. Id (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at280 (citations omitted)).
As the Court points out, "[b]y enacting § 2 [of the FAA].... Congress precluded States from
singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be
placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts.' Id (quoting Scherk v. Albeuto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
48. See P.L. 1967, ch. 430 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5948 (West
1980)).
49. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980).
50. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995) (providing for orders staying the judicial action or
compelling arbitration) with Me. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980) (providing for orders
either compelling or staying arbitration).
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Whether under the FAA or the Maine UAA, courts decide at the onset
of a dispute only the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate. 5' Any
contract "involving commerce," however, must be decided under the
FAA, unless the parties expressly agree otherwise. 2
Whether the FAA or the Maine UAA applies is not, therefore, a
question without consequence to consumers. First, most consumer
transactions arguably "involve commerce"' 3 in some way, so disputes
arising from the contract will be subject to the FAA and the federal
common law of arbitration created by numerous Supreme Court cases. 4
Conversely, any dispute between the parties that does not fall within the
reach of the FAA will be subject to the Maine UAA and the
interpretation of Maine courts." The rights of consumers, therefore,
might depend upon whether federal or state law applies:
The most obvious conflict between federal and state arbitration law
arises in those states that still deem arbitration agreements
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Although nearly all states,
now accept and promote arbitration in some or most contract disputes,
three states still embrace the common law hostility toward arbitration
and will enforce arbitration agreements only if the FAA applies.56
51. Compare 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1995) (providing for orders staying the judicial action and
compelling arbitration) with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5928 (West 1980) (providing for orders
either compelling or staying the arbitration). Although there are procedural differences, both the
FAA and the Maine UAA provide for the judicial forum where the existence or making of the
agreement is in dispute. The Maine UAA, however, enforces written contracts "to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties," ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 5927 (West 1980), whereas the FAA applies to controversies "thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995). Because the Maine UAA requires no nexus between
the dispute and the original transaction, it is broader in scope than the FAA. Where the dispute
arises out of the contract and the underlying transaction was one "involving commerce," the FAA
would apply. See id On the other hand, any dispute not "involving commerce," whether or not it
arises out of the contract, is subject to the Maine Act, as long as the parties "have manifested in
writing a contractual intent to be bound" by an agreement to submit any future controversy to
arbitration. Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779, 782 (Me. 1981).
52. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (holding that the
"involving commerce" language contained in section 2 of the FAA evidences Congress's intent that
the FAA apply in both federal and state courts); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
at 278 (holding the FAA applicable, even where the parties did not contemplate interstate activity).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Maine Law Court, however, has specifically held the FAA to
preempt any state arbitration act
53. Seesupranote5l.
54. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 2, at 397 (discussing the "expanding federal common
law of arbitration").
55. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53. Such controversies could include certain
employer-employee disputes, which are specifically included in the Maine Act but not in the FAA.
See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980). Another potential controversy not
specifically provided for in the FAA that could fall under the Maine UAA would be one between
a bank and its customer based on an agreement that "any dispute hereafter arising between the
parties" shall be heard by an arbitrator, and where the customer, injured on bank property, asserts
that this kind of injury was not within the scope of the agreement
56. Strickland, supra note 2, at 401 (footnotes omitted). The three states are Alabama,
Mississippi, and Nebraska. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993) (arbitration agreements cannot be
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Although Maine is not one of those states, Maine courts considering
the arbitrability of labor disputes under the Maine UAA have relied on
a limited public policy exception, which applies only to government
collective bargaining agreements." Still, it might come to be invoked
in determining the arbitrability of certain lender-consumer disputes.58
Courts could justify the use of such an exception on grounds that the
legislature did not enable lenders to "opt out" of consumer protection
statutes. 9 In disputes involving commerce, however, the FAA would
apply, as would the body of Supreme Court case law culminating in
Casarotto. Because most consumer loan and lease transactions "involve
commerce," they can easily be brought within the scope of the FAA. In
most disputes arising from these transactions, state courts will therefore
apply the FAA. For that reason, the primary focus of this Comment is
on the FAA and applicable Supreme Court case law.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act
1. Distrust ofArbitration: Wilko v. Swan (1953)
Initially, the Supreme Court did not look favorably upon agreements
to arbitrate entered into by securities investors. In Wilko v. Stvan,' a
securities customer alleged that, by relying on false representations of
the selling brokerage firm, he was induced to purchase securities." ' The
defendants then moved to stay the trial pursuant to section 3 of the
FAA.62 The district court denied the stay, but the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the FAA "did not prohibit the
specifically enforced); MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-15-101 (Supp. 1997) (only arbitration agreementt
involving specified construction projects will be enforced); see also State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub.
Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Neb. 1991) (finding Nebraska's Uniform Arbitration Act
unconstitutional to the extent that it requires enforcement ofpredispute arbitration agreements).
57. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
58. See infra notes 358-61 and accompanying text (discussing Article 1, section 19 of the
Maine Constitution). In basing a public policy exception on the Maine Constitution, courts would
be relying on Maine organic law rather than the expanding scope of the "federal common law of
arbitration." See Strickland, supra note 2, at 397. Concerns of federalism would justify such an
approach.
59. See Budnitz, supra note 32,at 317.
60. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
61. See id at428-29.
62. See id at429. Section 3 of the FAA provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit
or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application
of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994).
63. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 430.
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agreement to refer future controversies to arbitration."' The Supreme
Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the anti-waiver
provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 (SEA) override
any provision of the FAA that would otherwise compel a court to grant
a stay of proceedings.65
In the past, courts in the United States were suspicious of arbitration.
In certain respects, the Court in Wilko v. Swan continued this tradition
ofjudicial hostility towards arbitration clauses by interpreting the SEA's
protective provisions as requiring judicial direction in order to ensure
their effectiveness. 66
Today, the Supreme Court requires courts to avoid exactly this type
of "suspicion" of the arbitral process. 67 Unable to reconcile Wilko's
mistrust of arbitration with subsequent decisions construing the FAA,6"
the Court found Wilko's assumptions regarding arbitration to be
invalid.69 Continuing this line of reasoning in a subsequent case, the
Court then came to overrule Wilko explicitly."
2. Preemption of State Law and Congress's "Expansive" Intent:
Southland Corp. v. Keating (1983)
Post-dispute arbitration agreements have created little controversy,
whereas pre-dispute arbitration agreements have been more thoroughly
scrutinized, especially within the areas of antitrust, employer discrimi-
nation, and in cases where parties have invoked federal statutory rights.7'
In the last ten years, however, this reluctance to enforce pre-dispute
arbitration agreements has given way to a policy favoring enforcement.72
64. Id
65. See id at 437-38; see also id at 434-35. The Court viewed Congress's intent in passing
section 14 of the SEA as an attempt to put sellers of securities and buyers of lesser bargaining power
on an equal footing, and held that arbitration clauses are "stipulations" as reflected in the SEA that
could not function so as to constitute a waiver of compliance with any "provision" of the Act. See
id. The Court also held that "the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of 'provision' that
cannot be waived under § 14 of the Securities Act." Id at 435; see also SEA § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n
(1994).
66. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 437.
67. See, for example, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,231 (1987),
where the majority relied in part on Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Wilko, and rejected Wilko's
distrust of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals.
68. See id.
69. See id at 233. The Court also reasoned that, because the power of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) had expanded significantly following the 1975 amendments to
section 19 of the SEA, that agency could oversee arbitration proceedings involving securities
transactions. See id
70. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
71. See Wiegand, supra note 11, at 622.
72. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629
(1985) (holding that claims under the Sherman Act must be arbitrated where the arbitration
agreement arises from an international transaction); Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. at 481,484 (1989) (overruling Wilko after holding that the right to select ajudicial
forum is not, as previously determined, a "provision" within the meaning of the SEA that cannot
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The Supreme Court in Southland Corp. v. Keating" determined that the
FAA applies in both federal and state courts,74 and thereby effectively
foreclosed "the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration." 5
Southland began as a class action brought on behalf of approximately
800 California franchisees of 7-Eleven stores.76 The California Court of
Appeal reversed the superior court's denial of a motion to compel
arbitration, holding that claims under California's Franchise Investment
Law'7 are arbitrable. 8 Reversing that decision, the California Supreme
Court called for judicial consideration of the claims, and held that the
California statute was not preempted by the FAA.79 The United States
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that the "involving
commerce" clause of the FAA must be read as encompassing a reach as
full as that of the Commerce Clause; the FAA was thus made applicable
in both federal and state courts." Because the provision for voiding the
agreement was not based "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract,"' allowing that particular provision
of the Franchise Investment Law to stand, the Court reasoned, "would
frustrate congressional intent to place '[a]n arbitration agreement...
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.""
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, warned
against the danger of "'encroach[ing] on the powers which
Congressional policy, if not the Constitution, would reserve to the
states.""'s Justice Stevens implied that the Court had read Congressional
intent too expansively by "entirely... displac[ing] state authority in this
field." He emphasized the need to follow Congress's original intent,
which was "'to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
be waived); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (allowing the
arbitration of an ADEA discrimination claim).
73. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
74. See id at 12.
75. Id at 10, quoted in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,286 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Southland was ihongly decided).
76. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 4.
77. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (%Vest 1977) (providing that "[alny condition, stipulation
or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance mith any
provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void").
78. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 4-5.
79. See id
80. See id at 15 C"[S]ince the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country
is in the state courts, we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes
subject only tofederal-court jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
81. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
82. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting I-LR. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
(1924)).
83. Id at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp.
v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,386 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, CJ., concurring)).
84. Id at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
1998]
MAINE LA WREVIEW [Vol. 50:83
contracts, but not more so."' 5 Justice Stevens then concluded that the
California Supreme Court's decision not to enforce the arbitration
agreement should be affirmed. 6
In a strong dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that Congress intended
the FAA to apply only in federal courts, 7 describing the legislative
history of the FAA as unusually clear in this respect.88 She viewed the
FAA as a remedial statute, relating to procedure rather than substantive
law 9 and, as such, not "encroach[ing] upon the province of the
individual states."'  Nevertheless, the Court had come to view the right
to arbitration as substantive,9' and Justice O'Connor did not take issue
with this position. Rather, the numerous references in the legislative
history to Congress's power to rely on its Article Ill control over federal-
court jurisdiction constituted a clear indication that only a "flight of
fancy [would] permit Congress to control proceedings in state courts."'
Justice O'Connor cited the language of the FAA as proof that it was
intended to apply only in federal courts," then concluded that the FAA
"should have no application whatsoever in state courts."94 Instead, state
courts should continue to be "permitted to apply their own reasonable
procedures when enforcing federal rights."'
85. Id at 19 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,404 n.12 (1967)).
86. See id at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. See id at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see Janet M. Grossnickle, Note, Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the Federal Arbitration Act Will Keep Consumers and
Corporations Out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. REv. 769,773-74 (1995) (describing the legislative
history as "murky"). Note that the majority in Dobson referred to Congress's "expansive intent"
but offered no evidence that state law was intended to be preempted. See Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1995). On the other hand, as Justice O'Connor pointed out
in Southland, "the entire history contains only one ambiguity, and that appears in the single
sentence of the House Report [upon which the majority bases its holding that the FAA was intended
to apply also in state courts]." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 29 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor elaborated: "That ambiguity, however, is definitively resolved
elsewhere in the same House Report, ... and throughout the rest of the legislative history." Id.
Justice O'Connor's interpretation also finds support in the literature ofthe period: Julius Cohen and
Kenneth Dayton's article describes the purposes of the FAA as anything but "murky." See Cohen
& Dayton, supra note 16.
89. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. See id at27 n.13 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Committee on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law andlisApplication, 11 A.B.A. J, 153,
155 (1925)).
91. See id at 26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S.
198 (1956)).
92. Id at 28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. See id. at 29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the implementing provisions of
sections 3 and 4 of the FAA and their explicit references to federal courts).
94. Id at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
95. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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In spite of Justice O'Connor's concerns, the Court in Perry v.
Thomas' reaffirmed Southland's holding that the FAA withdrew the
power of the states to require the parties to arbitration agreements to
resolve their disputes before ajudicial forum.9 7 The Court then held on
the facts that the FAA preempted a California labor law that would have
allowed a complainant to maintain ajudicial action for wages.' "despite
the existence of an agreement to arbitrate."" Under the Supremacy
Clause, the state statute had to "give way."'' 00
In his dissent, Justice Stevens echoed Justice O'Connor's concerns
about the preemption problem:
Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50
years in 1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even
considered the possibility that the Act had preempted state-created
rights. It is only in the last few years that the Court has effectively
rewritten the statute to give it a preemptive scope that Congress
certainly did not intend.'
3. The Federal Arbitration Act Hits Home: Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson (1995)
In Dobson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Southland and concluded
that any transaction involving interstate commerce would be subject to
the FAA because the FAA was intended to reach "to the limits of
Congress' Commerce Clause power."'0 2 The plaintiff homeowners'
contention that they had not contemplated substantial interstate
activity0 3 by signing a termite prevention contract was therefore
rendered moot. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Alabama
high court's determination that the FAA did not apply to the contract in
dispute.' Consequently, the FAA was imposed upon the Alabama court
despite its finding that the underlying transaction was "primarily local"
in character. 5 Because the termite control company shipped treatment
and repair material from outside the state,' the requirements of the
Commerce Clause were satisfied, and the FAA was held to apply. The
new homeowners were thus denied redress in ajudicial forum for the in-
96. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
97. See id at 489 (quoting Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
98. See id
99. Md at 486.
100. See id at491.
101. Id at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995); see also 9 U.S.C. §
2 (1994) (stating that arbitration provisions are enforceable if they are contained in "a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce").
103. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 269.
104. See id at282.
105. See id at 269.
106. See id at 282.
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state termite infestation that the company had recently guaranteed to
treat and repair.1
7
Even more significantly, the Court noted that the application of the
FAA was not limited by any "statutory niche in which a State remains
free to apply its antiarbitration law or policy."08 As one commentator
concluded, "the [Dobson] Court has eviscerated numerous state statutes,
including statutes designed to protect consumers, and expanded the FAA
to cover transactions for which it was never designed."' 9 In spite of
such arguments, the Court declined to overrule Southland, even though
this had been requested by twenty state attorneys general."0
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor objected: "The reading of
§ 2 adopted [by the Court would] displace many state statutes carefully
calibrated to protect consumers .... ." Justice O'Connor adhered to
the belief that Congress never intended the FAA to apply in state
courts."' Nonetheless, because more than a decade had passed since
Southland, subsequent cases had built upon its reasoning, and parties had
contracted in reliance on the Court's interpretation of the FAA, Justice
O'Connor acquiesced in the Court's judgment.'" In her view, the task
of preserving state autonomy in state courts was thus left to Congress."
4
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia,
concluded that both holdings of Southland were "wrong.""
5
Accordingly, the dissent did not reach the statutory construction issue."6
Further, Justice Thomas felt that arbitration clauses were simply "a
species of forum-selection clause" and were understood by "lawyers in
1925" as procedural in nature." 7 In response to Justice O'Connor's stare
decisis concerns, Justice Thomas found "no reason to think that the costs
of overruling Southland [were] unreasonably high."' 8 He believed that
Justice O'Connor's stare decisis concerns were without merit; because
of the many similarities between state arbitration laws and the FAA,
many people would "simply comply with their arbitration agreement" in
order to cut costs." 9 Because Congress in 1925 had intended to preserve
107. See id. at 268.
108. Id. at 272-73.
109. Grossnickle, supra note 88, at 769.
110. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272.
111. Id at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See id. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. See id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. See id at 286 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to Southland's conclusion that (1) the
FAA applies in state and federal courts; and (2) withdraws the power of the states to require a
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to arbitrate).
116. See id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. Id at 289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at295 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas went on to point out that "[o]nly Alabama,
Mississippi, and Nebraska still hold all executory arbitration agreements to be unenforceable,
though some other States refuse to enforce particular classes of such agreements." Id (citing Strick-
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state laws rendering predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable,
Justice Thomas believed that the Court had no basis for "displac[ing] an
enormous body of state law."' 20
4. Disclosure Law Yields to the Commerce Clause: Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto (1996)
Justice O'Connor warned in Dobson that the Court's holding would
result in the invalidation of "many state statutes carefully calibrated to
protect consumers," such as disclosure laws enacted to ensure the
consensual formation of agreements to arbitrate.' This, in fact,
occurred one year later in Casarotto, where the Court again expanded
the reach of the FAA at the expense of state disclosure laws.
At issue in Casarotto was a Montana disclosure statute applicable to
arbitration agreements." Under the statute, '"[n]otice that a contract is
subject to arbitration' had to be "'typed in underlined capital letters on
the first page of the contract.""'  Failure to comply could result in the
dispute being declared "'not subject to arbitration.""12 4
Justice Ginsburg invoked Southland's withdrawal of the "power of
the states to require ajudicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration,"'" and reasoned
that unless such "special notice requirement[s were] applicable to con-
tracts generally," the statutes creating them would be displaced by the
FAA.'26 Thus, the Court held that state courts could no longer "invali-
date arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only to arbitra-
tion provisions."2
This holding erodes state power to ensure informed consent via
countless disclosure statutes not "applicable to contracts generally" but
rather to certain contract provisions.' The Supreme Court rejected
land, szpra note 2, at401-03 n.93). Finally, some cases would be litigated in federal court, where
the FAA would apply. See id
120. Id at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. Id at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(a) (Supp.
1993) and explaining that this statute "requir[ed] that notice of arbitration provision be prominently
placed on first page of contract") (other citations omitted)).
122. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1654 (1996).
123. Id (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
124. Id at 1655 (quoting Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 939 (Mont. 1994)). This
language is also contained in the Montana statute. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995).
125. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1655 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
126. Id at 1656.
127. Id (citingAllied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,279-81 (1996)).
128. See BriefAmici Curiae of the American Association of Retired Persons and the National
Association of Consumer Advocates in Support of Respondent at * 18-020, Doctor's Assocs. v.
Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996) (No. 95-559), available In 1996 WL 115782 [hereinafter
Casaroto Amid BrieA] (citing Califomia's requirement of bold type -to draw attention to a
liquidated damages provision in a real property purchase contract," and similar disclosure statutes
in Missouri, Texas, and Montana).
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arguments that because disclosure statutes commonly apply to many
contract provisions and not simply to arbitration clauses they should be
construed as defenses "applicable to contracts generally," which the
FAA identifies as grounds for invalidating arbitration agreements.
29
The Court left open, however, the question as to whether arbitration
clauses could be invalidated "under general, informed consent princi-
ples" established in state disclosure statutes regulating standardized con-
tracts but not limited to arbitration agreements. 3 '
C. Casarotto's Effect on Disclosure Laws
The disclosure law preempted under Casarotto was not by any means
the only law "applicable to contracts" that also contained provisions for
heightened disclosure of contract terms. For example, another Montana
disclosure law applicable to retail installment contracts ensures that
consumers are informed of their prepayment rights and warned not to
sign the contract without reading it.' This warning must appear in at
least ten-point type, and the entire contract may be printed in no smaller
than eight-point type.'32 Despite the existence of these laws applicable
to other classes of contracts, Montana's disclosure statute calling for the
voiding of non-conforming arbitration contracts was held to be
preempted by the FAA.'
Other states have either excluded certain transactions, such as leases,
sales, loan contracts, or residential real estate contracts, from their
arbitration statutes or required separate signing or initialling of
arbitration clauses.'34 As long as any such transaction lies within the
129. See id at *18 (arguing that disclosure laws are designed to ensure informed consent to
unanticipated terms of standardized adhesion agreements).
130. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656 n.3.
131. See MONT. CoDEANN. § 31-1-231(2) (1995).
132. See id.; Casarotto Amici Brief, supra note 128, at * 19.
133. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656. Laws in other states providing
similar remedies would also be preempted, including the Missouri disclosure provision that was
incorporated into its Uniform Arbitration Act, because it is applicable only to arbitration clauses
and not to "contracts generally." See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 291. An Oklahoma provision,
however, may lie beyond the reach of FAA preemption because a form of consumer protection
applicable to all contracts is built into the Oklahoma Constitution: "Any provision of a contract,
express or implied, made by any person by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought
to be waived, shall be null and void." OKLA. CONST. art. XXIII, § 8. This clause, "unique in
American organic law," was relied upon by an Oklahoma court in holding that any contract
provision calling for submission of future controversies to arbitration would constitute a waiver,
forbidden under the state constitution, of the right to jury trial. See Peter G. Pierce, III, The Law's
Excellent Banking Adventure-Recent Developments in the Bank-Customer Relation, Trends In
Lender Liability and the Impact of New Articles 3 and 4, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 309, 321
n.193 (1993) (citing Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235, 1239 (Okla. 1993)); see also Wiegand, supra
note 11, at 628-34 (discussing in the context of arbitration the Oklahoma constitutional provision
prohibiting contractual jury waivers).
134. See Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining Unfairness and Agreements to Arbitrate:
Judicial and Legislative Application of Contract Defenses to Arbitration Agreements, 1991 ANN.
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reach of the Commerce Clause, the FAA may effectively preempt these
efforts to insulate certain consumer transactions from the reach of
arbitration, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held. 3 '
Many federal statutes also call for the disclosure of significant
contract terms. 3 6 Typical consumer claims brought pursuant to these
statutes are centered on specific documents, access to which is impeded
by most arbitration rules. 31 It may, therefore, be "inappropriate for this
type of claim to be decided by arbitration."' 38 Still, the Supreme Court
has in recent years enforced arbitration of claims brought under these
statutes where the disputes arose from a transaction for which arbitration
had been contractually prescribed. 139 Again, inasmuch as these statutes
are applicable to arbitration contracts specifically, and not to "contracts
generally," they would be displaced by the FAA under Casarotto.
One question arising out of Casarotto is whether state plain language
laws will be displaced by the FAA. Certainly, any statute providing for
the invalidation of arbitration clauses not written in plain language
would be subject to attack.Y Unless the statute renders all contracts not
written in plain language unenforceable, the FAA would control.' To
the extent that these laws cover only consumer contracts and render any
consumer arbitration contract unenforceable, they may not survive an
SuRv. AM. L. 925, 959-60. States with such provisions include Indiana, Texas, Montana, and
Georgia. See it
135. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996); see also
discussion supra Part ILA (discussing similarities between the FAA and the Maine UAA).
136. Examples include: Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665(b) (1994); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994); Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1666-1666j (1994); and Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1994). These
statutes are cited in Budnitz, supra note 32, at 313.
137. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 314. Discovery is extremely limited in arbitration.
Usually, consumers may rely only on the use of a subpoena duces tecum, which makes the process
ineffective because consumers are often not able to identify all the documents needed at the outset
of the dispute. See id
138. Idt
139. See Southland Corp. v. Keating; 465 U.S. at 16; Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S.
CL at 1656.
140. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. CL at 1656. Such requirements would
"singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status," contrary to Casarotto's mandate. It
141. For a criticism of that approach, see Michael S. Friman, Plain English Statutes: Long
Overdue or Underdone?, 7 Loy. CoNsuMR L. REP. 103, 108 (1995). Although New York's 1978
mandate "that all consumer contracts be witen in plain English" has resulted in the achievement
of "many of its major objectives," critics of similar law argue that the attempt to streamline
contracts requires drafters to eliminate certain contingencies, thereby "increasing the risk of liability
for the parties." IL at 105, 108 (citing Albert j. Millus, Plain Language Laws: Are 77y Working?,
16 UCC L.J. 147, 152-53 (1983)). Such criticism is not without merit, for, "[e]ven when a contract
is streamlined and simplified, the resulting document may be even more complex than the original."
Id at 108. For example, "[m]erely saying 'holder in due course' does not begin to reduce the vast
complexity of that law. Thus, 'clarity does not automatically follow verbal brevity.'" 1d at 107
(quoting Harold A. Lloyd, Plain Language Statutes: Plain Good Sense or Plain Nonsense?,78
LAw LaR. J. 683, 683 (1986)).
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attack based on Casarotto's interpretation of the FAA requirement that
the courts invalidate arbitration agreements only by allowing defenses
"applicable to contracts generally." 142
The Maine PLL does not provide for the invalidation of arbitration
clauses.1 43 Rather, the Maine law, which applies to consumer loan and
lease agreements, provides for administrative disciplinary action, injunc-
tive relief, and civil penalties.'" Should an arbitration clause contained
in a consumer loan or lease agreement violate the statute, action could
be brought by the Attorney General and the statute would not be preemp-
ted. In that respect, the Maine PLL remains unaffected by Casarotto.
1 41
States can also "delegate to a government agency the task of issuing
format guidelines. Examples of appropriate agencies [include] ...
departments of consumer affairs and consumer protection divisions of
offices of the Attorney General .... ,14 In Maine, the Superintendent
of the Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection administers consumer cre-
dit laws, including the Maine PLL.' 47 Arbitration clauses are subsumed
under the broad language of that law because they constitute "writing[s]
... substantially prepared in advance of a consumer loan or consumer
lease and which a supervised lender or lessor furnishes to a consumer for
the consumer to sign in connection with that loan or lease."' 48 The
operative part of the statute sets no guidelines for arbitration clauses,
however, so amendments might be warranted to make it explicit that
arbitration clauses are included under the Maine PLL.1
49
142. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656. One provision of Maine law that
might be affected by Casarotto's reasoning is the uninsured motorist provision of the Maine UAA.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5948 (1964) ("This chapter shall not apply to any provision
contained in a policy of automobile insurance for arbitration of a claim under the uninsured motorist
coverage."). Maine courts could not construe this statute to invalidate such a clause, but rather,
would be obliged to apply the FAA and enforce the clause under Casarotto. Perhaps, however,
courts might invoke a public policy exception. See discussion supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text; infra notes 352-61 and accompanying text.
143. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1121-1126 (West 1997). See also Friman, supra
note 141, at 106 (describing similar laws in other states).
144. Section 1125 of the Maine PLL reads: "A supervised lender's or lessor's failure to
comply with the requirements of section 1124 shall constitute a violation of Title 9-A which shall
be enforceable under Title 9-A, section 6-108." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1125 (West 1997).
The latter provision provides for an administrative order to cease and desist from engaging in
violations of section 6-108 of the Maine Consumer Credit Code. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§§ 1-101 to 11-121 (West 1997). The administrator may, through the Attorney General, bring a
civil action seeking an injunction restraining persons from violating the Act. See Id. § 6-110.
145. But see discussion infra Part Ill.A (arguing that revisions applicable specifically to
arbitration clauses may be possible).
146. Budnitz, supra note 32, at 333.
147. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 6-103, 6-104 (West 1997) (defining
"administrator" and "administrator's powers"); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1121-1126
(West 1997) (Plain Language Law).
148. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1122(1) (West 1997).
149. Of course arbitration and collective bargaining agreements would be unaffected. The
PLL covers only loan and lease agreements entered into between supervised lenders or lessors and
does not apply to transactions exceeding $100,000. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1123 (West
1997).
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IT[. THE MAINE PLAIN LANGUAGE LAW AND THE MAINE UNIFORM
ARBITRATION ACT POST-CASAROTTO
A. Amending the Plain Language Lamv
Statutes such as those preempted by Casarotto are designed to ensure
the consensual formation of arbitration agreements. Contracts are
premised on mutual consent. 5 ' Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in
Casarotto reversed the Montana Supreme Court and invalidated the
Montana disclosure statute despite arguments that "[a] decision
affirming the Montana Supreme Court [would] further the bedrock
principle that enforceable contracts require the knowing, voluntary
consent of the parties."'' Still, the Supreme Court was adhering to the
federal policy favoring arbitration, and the Petitioners were not
unsophisticated or uneducated consumers.
The Maine PLL, insofar as it does not "single out" arbitration
agreements for special treatment, seems in fact to be unaffected by
Casarotto.'2 The Maine PLL, unlike the Montana statute displaced by
Casarotto, does not condition the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate on statutory compliance; rather, it provides for administrative
enforcement orders and civil actions for injunction brought by the
Attorney General.' Although the Maine PLL does not apply to all
"contracts generally," it does apply to all consumer loan agreements and
150. See, e-g., SubhaNarasimhan, OfEspeetatlons, Incomplete Contracting andthe Bargain
Principle, 74 CAL. L REV. 1123,1124 (1986) (discussing the necessity of parties freely consenting
"to undertake duties to each other," but noting that the historical debate whether to apply an
objective or subjective standard has been largely resolved in favor of objective manifestations); see
also Jeffrey IV. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrablilty, 65 TUL L RE . 1377, 1459 (1991)
(advocating reliance by courts on the nineteenth century "consent-based" approach when analyzing
the fbrmation of arbitration contracts); cf Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, & Territory, William
B. Lockhart Lecture (Mar. 30, 1989), in 74 MaIN. L REv. 1, 9 (1989) ("The application ofa legal
rule is necessary to find an effective expression of consent.... ."). Professor Brilmayzr argues that
courts, when deciding where to draw the line between enforceable and unenforceable adhesive
contracts must rely on external legal standards, and need legal rules in order to infer consent. See
iE at 25, 27. Seen in this light, consent-based arguments are "sometimes misleading and often
superfluous." Id at 35. Under the law of contracts, however, consent is a prerequisite to contract
formation, whether the subjective or objective standard is applied; as Professor Brilmayer
acknowledges, "silence usually does not constitute consent." Id at 8 (citing I A. Cotan,
CoNmAcrs § 72, at 304, § 73, at 310 (1963)).
151. CasarottoAmici Brief, supra note 128. at *3.
152. See discussion supra Part ILC; see also Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652,
1656 (1996) (stating that where state law "conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements
on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally," such law
will be displaced by the FAA).
153. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 1125 (Vest 1997); MF REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§ 6-108 OVest 1997) (stipulating that the administrator may, for example, order patty in violation
to cease and desist, take corrective action, and, through the Attorney General, seek judicial
enforcement of the order or injunction in superior court).
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leases within the statutory definition.'54 Arguably, therefore, the PLL
would not be preempted by the FAA under Casarotto, insofar as it does
not "singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status,""' but rather
applies to all contracts of that class. 56
Although the Maine PLL may be considered a general disclosure
statute, it contains none of the conspicuous notice requirements at issue
in Casarotto. Nor does it refer specifically to arbitration agreements, but
its general language is certainly broad enough to include arbitration
agreements formed in connection with covered loans.'57 Still, the
statutory definition of "agreement" could be amended by adding the
following italicized sentence:
"Agreement" means any writing which is substantially prepared in
advance of a consumer loan or a consumer lease and which a
supervised lender or lessor furnishes to the consumer for the
consumer to sign in connection with that loan or lease. Without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, 'writing' shall be construed
to include any agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration or
mediation. '58
Such an amendment would make explicit the legislature's intent to
include predispute arbitration agreements within the statutory
framework, without singling them out for suspect treatment.
The Maine PLL would also benefit from an amendment meant to
ensure the consensual formation of arbitration contracts formed in
connection with consumer loan and lease agreements. Currently,
although loan and lease agreements must be written in a clear and
coherent manner using words with common and everyday meanings,
they need only be "[a]ppropriately divided and captioned by [their]
various sections."' 59 Sections pertaining to arbitration, therefore, can
easily be buried among a myriad of other provisions. Where rights as
fundamental as the right to redress in court are being waived, public
policy dictates more explicit plain language requirements in order to
ensure knowing assent to the contract terms.
Therefore, the Maine PLL could also be amended to require notice in
large, bold type if the agreement contains provisions constituting
154. See ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 1122(1) (West 1997). Section 1122 defines
"agreement" to include writings furnished by supervised lenders or lessors in connection with a loan
or lease. See id "Consumer loan" is a loan made by a supervised lender for personal, family, or
household purposes, and includes loans made pursuant to credit cards. See Id. § 1122(4); see also
ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit 9-A, § 1-301(39) (West 199.7) (defining "supervised lender" as any
"person authorized to make or take assignments of supervised loans, either under a license issued
by the Administrator (section 2-301), or as a supervised financial organization (section 1-301,
subsection 38)").
155. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656.
156. See ME. Ray. STAT. ANN. tit 10, § 1122 (West 1997).
157. See id § 1122(1). An arbitration agreement would qualify as a "writing" furnished to
consumers in connection with loans or leases.
158. Cf id
159. Id
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possible waivers of Maine constitutional rights, including but not limited
to Article I, section 20 right to trial by jury, and Article I, section 19
right of redress for injuries."6t Adding such a provision to the Maine
PLL would serve two purposes. First, it would help ensure informed
consent while also avoiding arguments that the law singles out
arbitration agreements for suspect status; on the contrary, the provision
would apply to many other contract provisions, such as waivers of class
actions and punitive or treble damage awards, and would be applicable
to all contracts within the reach of the current Plain Language Law.'
6
'
Second, providing for arbitration agreements under the existing
statute rather than in a separate title would effectively utilize the existing
administrative structure created pursuant to the Maine Consumer Credit
Code. 62 The State would be relying on the Tenth Amendment and its
police power to protect the welfare of its citizens." More important, the
amended law would withstand challenges based on either Dobson or
Casarotto insofar as current administrative remedies would be relied
upon for enforcement rather than any equitable remedy providing for the
invalidation of agreements formed in violation of the statute.6 The
Attorney General would be exercising powers of enforcement similar to
those contained in the Maine Consumer Credit Code,'65 the Maine
Unfair Trade Practices Act,' and the Federal Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of 1994.67
160. See ME. CONST., art. I, §§ 19-20.
161. At the same time, the proposed changes would leave unaffected the arbitrability of
disputes arising from collective bargaining, construction contracts, and post-dispute arbitration
agreements. This has long been a concern of the Maine legislature. In fact, the Maine UAA wvas
originally made applicable only to "construction contracts and collective bargaining agreements."
P.L. 1967, ch. 430, amended by P.L. 1969, ch. 287, § 1; P.L 1971, ch. 544, § 46.
162. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1125 West 1997); ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§ 6-108 (West 1997). Similarly, provision could be made for the imposition of sanctions by the
Administrator or the Attorney General against lenders who incorporate distant forum clauses with
arbitration clauses. This would alleviate consumer hardship, especially where the claim is minimal
and the forum is considered "seriously-inconvenient." See generally Stempel, supra note 150, at
1410-11 (discussing several federal cases where consumers successfully argued in favor of
invalidating arbitration agreements that were formed in conjunction with distant forum clauses by
portraying the seriously inconvenient forum as a form of substantive unconscionability).
163. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
164. Note that the Maine PLL does not provide for any private cause of actiom See ME REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1121-1126 (West 1997).
165. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 6-101 to -204 (%Vest 1997).
166. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (West 1980).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(e) (1994). See Gary Klein, Preventng Home Equity Lending Fraud:
Special Truth in Lending Protections Enacted, 7 LOy. CONSUMER L REP. 126, 136 (1995)
(indicating that state attorneys general are empowered to bring actions to enforce the new
amendments).
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These statutes also allow for private causes of action. 68 When an
arbitration agreement is signed in connection with a loan, however, these
private actions will be argued in front of an arbitrator, absent a showing
that one of the parties did not intend the dispute to be decided by
arbitration. 169 To get to court, a plaintiff would need to overcome the
"strong policy favoring arbitration" by showing that the claim, on its
face, is not governed by the arbitration agreement.' Note that the court
and not the arbitrator would decide the question of substantive
arbitrability.'7 1
The PLL could also be amended to provide for similar private causes
of action by aggrieved consumers attempting to invalidate the arbitration
agreement by showing that provisions of the PLL were violated. Under
the Law Court's construction of the Maine UAA, however, such a
showing might not survive a motion for summary judgment. 72 In cases
where the language is unclear or ambiguous, however, courts could
conclude that no arbitration agreement was formed and invalidate the
agreement. The proposed amendments to the Maine PLL would aid
courts in making such a determination, but for private causes of action
under the PLL to be heard in court, the Maine UAA might require
modification.'73
B. Amending the Maine Uniform Arbitration Act
The Maine UAA might also be amended to allow courts to stay
consumer arbitration proceedings upon a showing that there was no
agreement to arbitrate meeting the requirements of the amended PLL.
Conversely, a showing by the adverse party that the statutory disclosures
were made would constitute prima facie evidence that an arbitration
168. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1994) (litigant can recover actual and statutory damages,
attorney's fees, and costs); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, §§ 5-201 to -202 (West 1997) (aggrieved
consumer may recover actual damages and attorney fees); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 213 (West
1997) (provides for a private cause of action).
169. See Westbrook Sch. Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 204, 207-08 (Me.
1979).
170. See id at208.
171. See id. at 207. But see First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943
(1995) (stating that the question of arbitrability is to be heard by the arbitrator if the agreement so
provides). In any event, the Maine PLL could be amended to provide for action by the Attorney
General on behalf of individual consumers aggrieved by lenders who persistently violate these
statutes by ignoring the mandates issued from prior state enforcement actions.
172. See Westbrook Sch. Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d at 207-08 (strictly
construing sections 5928 and 5938 of the Maine UAA).
173. For example, the Maine PLL could stipulate that consumers may bring a private action
in the courts to invalidate unclear or grossly ambiguous agreements to arbitrate. This would not
contradict the Maine UAA, which provides that "the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate." ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 5928(2) (West 1997). Creating a private cause of action under the Maine PLL would
survive preemption because all covered contracts, not simply arbitration agreements, would be
included. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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agreement existed, in which case the court would be obliged to compel
arbitration. 74 In this way, consumers bringing actions against
supervised lenders under the PLL and the Maine UAA would not be
forced to sacrifice the right to trial by jury and redress for injuries
guaranteed by the Maine Constitution,'71 unless a waiver of those
substantial rights had been secured in advance. The proposed
amendments would ensure the knowing and consensual execution of
such waivers.
The FAA applies to disputes involving commerce, so actions brought
under the Maine PLL as amended would need to survive preemption
arguments based on Casarotto. The amendments should therefore be
broadly drafted to invoke the substantial rights of consumers under the
Maine Constitution and to apply to an entire class of contracts.
Admittedly, providing for private causes of action could weaken the
effect of the law by exposing it to the invalidation prong of Casarotto.
Preemption arguments might be avoided, however, by invoking the
Maine Constitution as suggested. The Supreme Court would then need
to invoke the Commerce Clause in order to trump Maine organic law,
but concerns of federalism might caution against that approach.
IV. WHY CHANGE Is NEEDED: THE PROS AND CONS OF RESOLVING
CONSUMER-LENDER DISPUTES THROUGH ARBITRATION
A4. The Growth of Consumer Arbitration: How Consumers Are
Affected
As shown above, arbitration initially served the purpose of providing
expert and timely adjudication of disputes that arose between merchants
of presumed equal bargaining power. 17 Since the early part of this
century, arbitration has expanded its reach to embrace disputes between
securities investors and sellers. Many securities investors may be more
sophisticated than average consumers who lack the resources to invest.
Still, investors have been called "'novices' or rookies in the dispute
resolution" process. 77 Moreover, a growing number of consumers have
174. See generally Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5928 (West 1980). This statute provides:
On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened
on a showing that there is no agreement to arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial
and bona fide dispute, shall be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if
found for the moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the
parties to proceed to arbitration.
RI, This could be amended without difficulty by referencing the amended Maine PLL and
specifying that violation or compliance therewith would be prima facie evidence of the non-
existence or existence of covered consumer loan and lease agreements.
175. MF. CONST. art. I, §§ 19-20.
176. See discussion supra Part I.
177. Brunet, supra note 13, at 104 (quoting Marc Galanter, fhy the "Halves" Come Out
Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95, 97 (1974)).
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begun investing in securities."'8 A recent survey conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) shows that "96% of all
margin accounts were covered by arbitration agreements as were 95%
of all options accounts and 39% of all cash accounts."'79  This
widespread reliance on arbitration by the securities industry has not,
however, resulted in dispute resolutions that are always fair to the
consumer.
80
Arbitration of disputes between investors and securities dealers has
been shown to disfavor the consumer. Investors, unlike industry litigants
who are "repeat players" in the arbitral process, often have little or no,
access to information about the arbitrator assigned to hear the dispute.
Although the Code of Arbitration Procedure of the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) allows "disqualification of an arbitrator
'for cause,' and... the right to a single peremptory challenge,'' the
NASD does not require a written record that reflects the arbitrator's
reasoning and analysis; the consumer's peremptory challenge thus
becomes meaningless.' Lacking prior exposure to particular
arbitrators, the consumer is handicapped: the NASD writes the rules and
chooses the arbitrators." Finally, the lack of knowledge of an
arbitrator's past decisions places consumers at an extreme disadvantage
to industry representatives, who have access to such information because
they are directly involved in the 6000 reports written annually.'
Although securities investors may arguably be at a disadvantage in
terms of bargaining power as compared with merchants, they do have the
178. See, e.g., Concerning the Commission's Appropriations Request for Fiscal Year 1998,
105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur Leavitt, Chairman, U.S. SEC), available in 1997 WL
8220218 ('Today, one out of three American households invests in mutual funds. The number of
first-time investors grows daily, and will accelerate if Congress acts to privatize a portion of the
Social Security program.").
179. Brafford, supra note 4, at 333 n.10 (citing C. EDWARD FLETCHER, ARBITRATINo
SECURIrES DISPUTES 176 (1990)). Although Brafford explains that consumers seeking to
invalidate arbitration agreements must show that they would be denied a fair hearing in arbitration,
id. at 350, she later concedes that "the sometimes competing values of freedom of contract and
fairness of enforcing arbitration clauses as drawn by the parties will have to be balanced against one
other [sic], and a compromise will have to be made if Congress determines that businesses are
abusing arbitration clauses." Id, at 361.
180. According to a telephone survey of 402 American Bar Association members conducted
in April 1996 by Research USA with a margin of error of+ 5%, "73% of defense lawyers and 70%
of plaintiff's lawyers worry about biases or qualifications of arbitrators, mediators or other neutrals."
Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.BA J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 58. Their worries
are not unfounded; although the "secrecy" of ADR proceedings has resulted in a lack of meaningful
statistics, arbitration of consumer disputes has been seen as inherently unfair. See infra notes 250-
54 and accompanying text.
181.. Norman Brand, UnbiasedArbitration? It Depends On Who Is Making the Rules, Los
ANGELES DAmY J., Aug. 5, 1994, at 2.
182. See id Further, the names of arbitrators are excluded from the written record and "[aill
you can tell is who won and who lost" Id
183. See id
184. See id
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added protection provided by the SEC's oversight authority.195
Consumers and homeowners signing loan agreements lack this
administrative umbrella. Nonetheless, a growing number of financial
institutions are incorporating arbitration clauses into their consumer loan
agreements.
In recent years, major lenders have begun utilizing arbitration clauses
in consumer credit card agreements. Many consumers, however, are not
aware of either the clauses themselves or the fact that they entail a
waiver of the right to litigate any claims before a judge orjury. In the
past, states have enacted consumer protection laws to help combat the
problem of consumer ignorance associated with arbitration clauses in
consumer credit agreements by requiring lenders to disclose these
clauses adequately to ensure informed consumer consentIs These laws
were invalidated by Casarotto.t'
Due perhaps to the "warm receptivity" afforded to arbitration
contracts of all sorts by the Supreme Court in recent decisions, in "the
past decade alone, arbitration clauses have become commonplace in
commercial contracts and have been honored in circumstances never
before possible." ' During the spring of 1992, Bank of America,
headquartered in California, announced that it would impose binding
arbitration on its credit card, checking, and savings account customers."
Shortly thereafter, a consumer group, joined by the California Trial
Lawyers' Association and others, filed suit in San Francisco County
Superior Court. 9 Their complaint alleged that Bank of America was
"'unilaterally imposing this [arbitration provision] based on a signature
card that a person might have signed twelve years [earlier]""'' . and
thereby forming an agreement to arbitrate without informed consumer
consent. 19
185. See ShearsonAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,233 (1987) (arbitralion
of disputes in context of securities exchanges no longer to be distrusted due to expansion of SEC
authority). See discussion infra Part IV.B.I.
186. See Paul M. Barrett, High Court to Consider Validity of State Shield on Arbitration,
WVALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1996, at B6 ("In addition to Montana, eight states, including Missouri, South
Carolina and Vermont, [had] special notice requirements for arbitration clauses.").
187. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. C. 1652 (1996). Casarotto overruled the
Montana Supreme Court's finding that Montana law witten to ensure that arbitration contracts "be
entered knowingly" was not preempted by the FAA and its underlying "goals and policies." See id
at 1655 (quoting Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931,939 (1994) and citing MoNT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114(4) (1995)).
188. Wiegand, supra note 11, at 619; see also discussion supra Part ILB (discussing
development of Supreme Court cases).
189. See Sam Zuckerman, Bankdmerlca to Force Lawsuits into Arbitration, A. BANKER,
June 4, 1992, at 1.
190. See Walter Hamilton, Group Files Suit Over Arbitration, LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 5, 1992, Bus. Sect at 1.
191. Id, (quoting Ken McEldowney, Executive Director, Consumer Action).
192. See id
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Prior to the filing of the complaint in Badie v. Bank of America,"
other courts had invalidated arbitration agreements on grounds of
unconscionability." 4 In doing so, some have relied in part on arguments
that contracts of adhesion formed between parties of imbalanced
bargaining power are grounds for a finding of unconscionability. 95
Nevertheless, "adhesion itself does not appear to constitute a sufficient
basis for invalidating arbitration agreements."' 96  The California
Supreme Court has, however, invalidated an arbitration agreement as
adhesive, reasoning that it lacked an express waiver of the parties' right
to a jury trial. 1" Soon after the decision, however, the court ordered this
opinion not to be published in official reports, perhaps because another
court was to deliver its opinion in Badie, which has been described as a
"high-profile" arbitration case.
198
In Badie, the trial court found for the defendant bank, holding that the
clause was neither unfair nor unconscionable.' The court further
found that the bank had reserved the right to modify its agreements at
any time and that the notice to consumers was "effectively
communicated."'2"o More important, the contract was not invalidated on
grounds of adhesion due to the presence of meaningful choice: people
could terminate their accounts and go to another lender. The court
reasoned that "at the time the Bank adopted the ADR Clause, there was
193. No. 94-4916, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. Super. Aug. 18, 1994).
194. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Poyhanya, No. 92AP40, 92AP-41, 1992 Ohio Ct.
App. LEXIS 5095, at *7 (10th App. Dist. Ct, Sept. 29, 1992); Trupp v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 575 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); cf. Ex Parte Redshaw, Inc., 524 So.2d 367,369
(Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (finding abuse of discretion by trial judge who invalidated agreement to
-rbitrate on grounds that hearing in distant forum was undue burden on one party, but suggesting
.hat unconscionability would be grounds for invalidation). Finally, unconscionability is grounds
for the revocation of any contract. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
195. See Stempel, supra note 150, at 1412 (citing Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles,
Inc., 430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981), and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960), for the proposition that courts may invalidate warranty disclaimers for consumer purchases
on grounds of adhesion and unconscionability).
196. Id One commentator has argued that courts do not rely on any independent doctrine of
adhesion without invoking unconscionability as an additional ground for invalidating arbitration
agreements. See Brafford, supra note 4, at 348-49. Another legal scholar suggests that courts could
use the doctrine of adhesion as "an alternative to unconscionability." See Budnitz, supra note 32,
at 306. Consumers could only waive their rights to ajudicial forum "knowingly and intelligently,"
and this only becomes possible where they are given information about the applicable procedural
rules upon signing the arbitration contract. See id
197. See Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 209-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
see also Budnitz, supra note 32, at 305 n.323 (noting that the petition for review was denied and
the opinion was ordered unpublished as a result of indirect pressure from Bank of America)
(citations omitted).
198. See Brafford, supra note 4, at 347.
199. See Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 94-4916, at 19 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 18, 1994) (notice
of entry of final judgment after trial) (copy on file in the MOCC).
200. See id. at 9-11.
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vigorous competition for deposit account and credit card account
customers."20 1
On appeal, the Appellate Department upheld the lower court's
decision.2 °2 In an oral decision, Judge Mellon adhered to state precedent
according to which arbitration was viewed as "a favored means of
resolving disputes by the law., 203 He relied further on the fact that all
plaintiff customers had received and read the "succinct" notice and that
adequate alternatives existed in the marketplace.' Finally, because the
bank had retained the right to modify its agreement, neither the
defendant's conduct nor the clause was found to be unfair or deceptive;
the arbitration clause was, therefore, enforced.05 Yet, as Judge Mellon
hinted, "[t]he question of whether [the] choice [among lenders offering
alternatives to arbitration would] continue to exist in the future"2z  could
pose a significant problem to consumers and render certain adhesive
arbitration agreements unconscionable.2 7 Such would be the case, for
example, were most lenders to resort to arbitration.
In fact, Wells Fargo, California's second largest bank, soon joined in
the parade by imposing upon its customers a mandatory arbitration
program.20 8 Other lenders, including lenders doing business in Maine,
soon followed suit.209 Maine leaders may have been responding to the
removal in 1994 by the Maine Legislature of the previous eighteen
percent cap on credit card interest rates in order to "slow the tide of
credit card operations moving from Maine to other, less regulated
states."'2 0 In 1995, restrictions on late fees, return-payment fees, and
201. Id at22.
202. See Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 94-4916, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal. Super. Aug. 18, 1994).
203. Id at *4.
204. See zd at *6.
205. See Id at *7. Badie has been appealed to the California Court of Appeal. See Badie v.
Bank ofAm., CIV. # A 068753 (Cal. Ct. App., App. Dist. 1, Div. 2). Oral argument was orginally
scheduled for February 1997, but was postponed until a new panel ofjudges could be assigned. The
prior judges recused themselves due to personal involvement with Bank of America. Telephone
interview with Attorney Patricia Sturdevant, Lead Trial Counsel for Plaintiff and General Counsel
to the Nat'i Ass'n of Consumer Advocates (Sept. 15, 1997). As this Comment %.nt to pr a new
date for oral argument had not been set. Telephone Interview with Attorney Kim E. Card, Lead
Counsel on Appeal for Plaintiff (Jan. 20, 1998).
206. Badie v. Bank of Arm, No. 94-4916, 1994 W'L 660730, at '6 (Cal. Super. Aug. 18,
1994).
207. This concern was not relevant to the case at bar because, the court found, customers had
sufficient options in 1992, when the plaintiffs' claim arose. See ld
208. See Green, supra note 14, at 115 (citing Stephen G. Hirsch, Wells Fargo Ventures into
ADR, THE RECoRDEt, July 7, 1992).
209. The Maine Office of Consumer Credit Regulation (MOCC) has eaxamined the arbitration
clauses contained in several agreements currently used by supervised lenders doing business in
Maine. Interview with William N. Lund, Maine Credit Regulator, in Freeport, Me. (Jan. 31, 1997).
See discussion infra accompanying notes 229-41.
210. DOWNEASTER GUIDE TO CREDrr CARDs at it (6th ed. 1989) (formerly provided to
consumers by and available at the MOCC); see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 9A, § 2-202(3) (West
1997) (exempting credit card issuers from 18% cap).
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other credit card account charges were removed.21' Caps on annual fees
were also repealed.212 In part to increase the tide of lenders coming into
the state, the Legislature further amended the Consumer Credit Code by
repealing restrictive small loan laws and deregulating credit cards issued
by supervised lenders.2 3  The effects of this legislation were felt
immediately. By April 1996, representatives from several major
consumer lenders were "scouring commercial locations in several Maine
cities, looking for appropriate office space. 214
Although the incoming tide may have resulted in a broader range of
lenders from which Maine consumers may choose, the number of lenders
using arbitration clauses is also increasing.25 At the same time,
agreements to arbitrate are being combined with "choice of distant
forum" clauses and inserted in the fine print of credit card solicitations.
For example, some Maine residents have recently received credit card
applications containing a succinct statement that "[a]ny disputes or
claims over $5000 will be decided by arbitration.... Any arbitration
will be heard in Richmond, Virginia.'2 6 In these two finely printed
sentences, no explanation is given of what the arbitral process means for
consumers, nor of what is given up by signing the clause.217
In the past, similar forum selection clauses have been enforced even
with minimal manifestations of assent. Such was the case, for example,
where American passengers of the ill-fated Achille Lauro cruise ship
were forced to litigate in Naples, Italy, based on a forum selection clause
printed on a ticket that was given to them only at the time they boarded
211. Public Law 1995, chapter 137, "An Act to Create Additional Employment
Opportunities," became effective "immediately upon its May 22, 1995 signing." See Credit-
Related Laws Enacted, MAINE CREDITOR UPDATE, Aug. 1995, at 1; P.L. 1995, ch. 137 (codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-501(4) (West 1997)).
212. See P.L. 1995, ch. 84, §§ 2-4 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 2-202 (West
1997)).
213. See P.L. 1995, ch. 614 (effective July 4, 1996) (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-
A, § 2-501(4) (West 1997)).
214. New Code Law Sparks Lender Activity, Protects T-i-L Exemption, MAINE CREDITOR
UPDATE, Apr. 1996, at 1.
215. Interview with William N. Lund, Maine Credit Regulator, in Freeport, Me. (Jan. 31,
1997).
216. Visa Agreement of FNANB (Winter 1997) (on file in the MOCC).
217. The Supreme Court is reluctant "to scrutinize carefully consumer contracts for possibly
adhesive agreements to arbitrate." Brunet, supra note 13, at 108. Even agreements to arbitrate in
a distant forum contained in boilerplate language on the back of cruise tickets have been enforced.
See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590-91 (1991). "Judge Learned Hand
reasoned that '[a] man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not."' Gaunt
v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947). Still, imposing arbitration
in distant fora on unwitting consumers seems to stretch this reasoning to its limits. Although one
might argue that enforcement of such provisions could result in fewer unsuspecting customers,
consumer education would be by word-of-mouth, because commercial arbitration proceedings are
most often conducted in secret. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 84-85. Relying on a trickle-down
approach to consumer education seems unduly harsh and ineffective.
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the ship." 8 Justice is arguably served where, "[a]fter signing [an]
agreement, the party is held strictly accountable for all terms in the
contract whether or not the terms were read and understood." 219 On the
other hand, where the party did not sign the agreement, and is "totally
unaware that [it is] waiving any legal rights simply by accepting [a]
ticket," justice could be better served by rendering the agreement
voidable." Although acceptance of the ticket could be characterized as
an objective manifestation of assent, actual or subjective assent might be
lacking. This lack of assent warrants the application of a subjective
standard in such cases. Nonetheless, distant forum clauses have been
upheld." At the same time, inequality of bargaining power does not
often invalidate agreements to arbitrate.' Until courts adopt a
subjective standard, consumers fail to read the fine print at their own
peril, even when they are given no time to do so.'
In Maine, lenders may avoid the reach of statutes enacted for the
protection of consumers. Such would be the case under Maine's usury
statutes." 4 Borrowers affected by the statutes are particularly "unaware
or unconcerned" about the rights they are waiving when they sign loan
agreements containing arbitration clauses.' The unfairness of the
arbitral process to certain consumers thus becomes evident: "It would
completely undermine the usury laws if lenders could evade them by
218. See Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 858 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. dksmused490
U.S. 1001 (1989). The Third Circuit reversed the lower court, rejecting arguments that
overwhelming bargaining power had been used to deny passcngers any real opportunity to read the
forum selection clause contained on the ticket, even if that meant that "Neapolitan litigation w-ould
effectively deprive the appellees of a meaningful day in court" Jd at 912; see also Stempel, supra
note 150, at 1388 ("Although Hodes reached an outrageous result, it represents a significant line
of cases treating boilerplate ticket language as enforceable contracts." (citations omitted)). Most
astonishing is the fhctthat the plaintiff passengers did not receive their tickets until arriving at the
pier. See id at 1388 n.57.
219. Green, supra note 14, at 113 (citation omitted).
220. Hodes v. Achille Lauro, 858 F.2d at 907.
221. See id The appellees were forced to "pursue their action in Italy." Id at 916.
Consumers should be forewarned, therefore, to read the "vcry small but readable print, less than
1/16 inch high-" Id at 910. But see Lauro Lines S.R.L v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (affirming
Second Circuit's refusal to hear interlocutory appeal of decision that had refused to require Achille
Lauro passenger to bring suit in Italy).
222. See Judith Resnick, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudicatio% 10 Omio ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL 211,226 (1995) (citing Gilmer v. InterstateiJohnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,33 (1991)). Professor Resnick acknowledges, however, that "[o]ne set of
cases continues to explore themes of contracts of adhesion among parties with disparate bargaining
power." Id at 226 n.63 (citations omitted).
223. See discussion infra note 236 and accompanying text (supporting the application of a
subjective standard to adhesive consumer arbitration contracts).
224. See ME. REv. STAT. kAN. tit. 9-A, § 2-401 (West 1997) (establishing caps on interest
rates for consumer loans between 15% and 30% depending on the amount of the loan); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 2-201 (,Vest 1997) (establishing similar caps on interest rates in consumer
credit sales).
225. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at326 (citing Stem-art S. Sterk, Enforceability ofAgreerents
to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CAPDoZo L REV. 481, 526 (1981)).
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diverting all consumer loan disputes to arbitrators to whom lenders could
make an appeal to fairness or justice." 6 Arbitration is attractive to
lenders for many of the same reasons it should be rejected-and would
be rejected were the parties fully informed-by the average consumer.
Ironically, the most vulnerable consumers are the least likely to be aware
of any reasons not to enter into arbitration agreements. 227 The amend-
ments proposed in this Comment would serve to level the playing field.
B. Amendments Will Ensure Fair Disclosure and Serve to Inform
Consumers
Why are the amendments necessary? 221 Is not arbitration effective
and fair under the current system? First, the amendments are necessary
so that consumers signing agreements to arbitrate future disputes with
their lenders understand the process for which they are contracting, as
well as the substantive rights they are sacrificing. Consumers should
know that they are waiving the right to redress in court, and they should
be familiar with the arbitration procedures, as well as the location of the
forum. The proposed amendments might encourage consumer inquiry
and heighten consumer awareness during the loan origination process,
or at least at the closing table.
Finally, amendments providing for the clear and unambiguous
disclosure of the terms contained in arbitration contracts are warranted
because many Maine lenders engage in inconsistent practices, the effect
of which is to impede consumers' ability to discern the actual terms of
arbitration contracts. Following routine compliance examinations, the
arbitration clauses utilized by several lenders were challenged by the
Maine Office of Consumer Credit Regulation (MOCC).229 For the sake
of brevity, only two lenders will be discussed in this Comment.23
226. Id.
227. This is especially true for consumers who are borrowing from lenders of last resort and
who are consequently forced to accept extremely unfavorable terms, such as high origination fees,
exorbitant interest rates, and pre-payment penalties. The lack of sophistication and legal
representation of many of the consumers who "agree" to these unfavorable terms aggravates the
situation. This problem is compounded further when consumers signing arbitration agreements are
told at closing only, "by signing this you agree that if you have a claim against the lender, you
cannot go to court to resolve it." Having served as a loan closing agent for several years, this
Author can attest that it is not uncommon for such generalizations to be made during the closing.
228. It might be objected that major lenders may leave Maine if these proposals were adopted,
thereby negatively impacting consumers' ability to obtain credit. These proposals, however, are
intended to ensure the consensual formation of arbitration contracts and to insulate Maine
consumers from lenders that abuse the arbitration process.
229. Agency examinations were conducted on November 21, 1996. Copies are on file in the
MOCC. See supra note 209.
230. All documents pertaining to the investigations of these and other lenders are on file in
the MOCC. The agreements used by these lenders are not atypical. A cursory search in the several
county registries of deeds in Maine will reveal similar clauses contained in recorded mortgages, and
one has only to open the daily mail and read the fine print to discover such clauses in credit card
applications.
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The first lender investigated was AVCO, whose arbitration plan
stipulates that the consumer must pay a non-refundable filing fee of
between $500 and $5000, depending on the amount of the claim
asserted, in order for the dispute to be heard." The creditor reserves the
right of access to the courts in the event of default, whereas the
consumer must resort to arbitration in all cases. 2 The pre-closing
information sheet given to consumers provides that "[e]ither party may
request that the award include findings of fact and conclusions of law,"
whereas the actual contract clause requires the consumer to waive any
request for findings of fact? 3 Similarly, the arbitration clause states that
costs shall be split equally, whereas the information sheet indicates that
the arbitrator may assess costs to either party exclusively.' The
disclosure statement provides for the arbitration to be heard in the
consumer's county of residence, whereas the actual contract provides for
a location designated by the arbitrator as "reasonably convenient to the
Parties." 5 Adoption of the proposed amendments might at least serve
to counter the effect of such discrepancies and inconsistencies.'
Other potential problems are found in AVCO's documents. For
example, although the contract provides that "[t]he Arbitrator shall
determine the rights and obligations of the Parties according to the
substantive and procedural rules of the state where the Arbitration is
held," it also provides that each party shall pay the expenses of its own
counsel, " even though this is in direct contradiction to Maine law."
231. See Arbitration Fee Schedule furnished by AVCO (Nov. 21, 1996) (on file in the
MOCC). The contours of the fee schedule are as follows: for claims up to $10,000, a $500 filing
fee must be paid by the consumer filing the complaint; claims betwen $50,000 and $250,000
require a fee of $1500; and, any claim over $1,000,000 involves a filing fee of S5000. See Id
Obviously, the greatest hardship is on the average consumer who may have a claim of under $500,
still a substantial amount for many, yet that consumer will not be allowed to pursue the claim in
small claims court
232. See Arbitration Disclosure and Agreement furnished by AVCO and corresponding
Examination Report issued by the MOCC (Nov. 21, 1996) (on file in the MOCC).
233. I,
234. See id
235. See id
236. This problem could also be addressed by adopting a subjective standard for the review
of consumer arbitration contract formation. See discussion Infra notes 307, 410-12 and
accompanying text.
237. AVCO Agreement on file in the MOCC; see also Examination ofAVCO, Nov. 21, 1996,
on file in the MOCC, where Maine Credit Regulator William N. Lund reported:
The Maine Consumer Credit Code allows a consumer who claims that he or she has
been harmed to seek redress in civil court. Further, the Code prohibits a creditor from
requiring that a consumer waive any rights granted by the law. Finally, the Code
provides that, upon a finding of a violation, the Court shall award attorney's fees to the
consumer.
238. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 5-201(1), (9) (Vest 1997) (noting that the consumer
has a right to bring court action for violation of enumerated provisions of the Consumer Credit Code
and that the court may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees); Id § 1-107 C'Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, a consumer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under
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Might this clause lead consumers to believe that they have no right even
to contact the MOCC for a speedy resolution of disputes with lenders?
Fearing this to be the case, that agency requested that AVCO provide
statements affirming the ability of consumers to file such complaints." 9
Similar concerns are raised in documents utilized by United
Companies Lending Corporation (UCLC). The MOCC complains that
the Maine Consumer Credit Code prohibits creditors from requiring
consumers to waive their rights under the Code: "Those rights include
the right to seek the assistance of the Office of Consumer Credit
Regulation, or to bring a civil action seeking damages and costs
(including attorney's fees) if the consumer demonstrates that the creditor
has violated the law."24 UCLC's contract provides that "[t]he laws
applicable to the arbitration proceeding shall be the laws of the state in
which the Property is located.""24 Although Maine law provides the
aforementioned civil remedies, arbitrators are likely to guard jealously
their jurisdiction and find that, by signing the arbitration agreement, the
aggrieved consumer waived those remedies. The legislative
amendments proposed in this Comment would at least ensure that
consumers make informed choices when executing such waivers.242
C. Because Arbitration Often Disfavors Consumers, Conspicuous
and Unambiguous Disclosure Is Warranted
Whether arbitration is effective and fair depends upon whom you ask.
Lenders often resort to arbitration to avoid punitive damages and costly
class actions.243 Although the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
does not prohibit arbitrators from awarding punitive damages, the
Supreme Court has indicated that they may be avoided altogether by
resorting to arbitration.244 In an attempt to avoid such damages, many
this Act Any such waiver or agreement is unenforceable; and no creditor may take any such waiver
or agreement to forego rights or benefits under this Act.").
239. See Examination of AVCO, Nov. 21, 1996, on file in the MOCC. It was also feared that
in the event that the lender exercised its right to bring a collection action in the courts, the consumer
would remain obliged to refer any counterclaims to arbitration. See id. Although some lenders
responding to investigations of the MOCC, including AVCO and United Companies Lending
Corporation, have promised that consumers will be afforded the same remedies in arbitration as
would be available in any Maine court, such as attorney fees and treble damages, most have also
indicated that arbitration is here to stay. Telephone Interview with William N. Lund, Maine Credit
Regulator (Sept. 13, 1997).
240. Examination of UCLC, Nov. 21, 1996, on file in the MOCC; see also supra note 168
(citing Maine statutes providing consumer remedies).
241. Contract contained in Mortgage from consumer to UCLC, on file in the MOCC.
242. See discussion supra Part IM.
243. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 286.
244. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1995) (holding
that arbitrators may award punitive damages if the contract so provides, even if state law does not
grant arbitrators these powers). The Court explained that, where state law allows arbitrators to
award punitive damages but the rules of the arbitral forum do not, those rules would control due to
the federal policy favoring arbitration. See id. at 62.
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lenders incorporate into their contracts express provisions prohibiting
the award of punitive damages altogether, or providing a cap in
jurisdictions that void such provisions for reasons of public policy 45
Even where punitive damages are available, an arbitrator, often an
attorney or business person, is less likely to render such an award than
juries, composed of consumers, who may empathize with the plaintiff
because they share unsatisfactory experiences with financial
institutions.246
Consumers, however, may not always fare better with a jury. For
example, "where the consumer is in default on a debt or has a claim
based on a legal technicality or boring, complicated facts, an arbitrator
might be at least as favorable as a... jury.2 47 Interestingly, many
lenders exempt from arbitration those collection and foreclosure
proceedings initiated by the lender 48 Does that mean that consumers
cannot file counterclaims in a foreclosure proceeding? At least one state
regulator thinks that might be the case.249 At the same time, consumers
who initiate actions based on particularly egregious lender practices will
"lose the opportunity to play upon the jury's emotions.2" ° Avoiding
jury sentiments is the precise result sought by lenders, who retort that
consumers knowingly consenting to arbitration contracts get the forum
for which they bargained,"' and that the Contracts Clause demands that
courts uphold these agreements. 2
Meanwhile, financial institutions have other reasons for favoring
arbitration. Under most arbitration rules, substantial limits are placed
upon discovery, and these limits have been shown to disfavor consumers
who usually lack critical information and documents within the control
of the lender. 3 Alternatively, one can argue that limited discovery
helps cut costs on both sides of the dispute. At the same time, there is
some evidence that discovery in arbitration is becoming more
245. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 899 (advising lenders to draft contracts in this
manner).
246. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 286.
247. Id at 285.
248. See discussion of UCLC supra Part IV.B.
249. Interview with William N. Lund, Maine Credit Regulator, in Freeport, Me. (Jan. 31,
1997). When asked about a clause which required a consumer to take a counterclaim to arbitration
rather than raising it in court, UCLC's attorney told Maine state credit regulators that the challenge
addresses issues of federal law, and that the lender "know[s] of no Maine law that prohibits
unilateral or bifurcated arbitration clauses." Letter from Michaela Albon, Vice President and Legal
Counsel, UCLC, to Del Pelton, Principal Examiner, Office of Consumer Credit Regulation (Apr.
14, 1997) (on file with the MOCC).
250. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 285.
251. Again, this argument assumes that the parties freely entered into a bargain, and
bargained at arm's length: "But an alternative is only an alternative if it is freely chosen." Tested
But Untried (A Survey of the Legal Profession), ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 13.
252. See Brafford, supra note 4, at 361; U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 10. As Brafford recognizes,
however, freedom of contract must be balanced against the unconscionability evident in the drafting
of contracts by lenders in such a way as to create a grossly uneven playing field.
253. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 283-84.
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sophisticated, complex, and costly.254 It is ironic that consumers may
now be gaining access to documents heretofore beyond the reach of
limited discovery rules only to be faced with the same adjudicatory
inefficiencies that arbitration was intended to eliminate.
The lending industry also stands to benefit by avoiding class actions.
Although, in theory, class actions are more efficient than arbitration of
singular disputes, they may be avoided altogether by "expressly negating
them in an arbitration agreement." '55 Even where the arbitration
agreement contains no such exclusion, courts have declined to compel
arbitration on a class basis. 6 Because this area is subject to dispute and
courts may differ as to the result, practitioners are advised to
"specifically state in the arbitration clause whether class actions are
permissible or not."'257 Thus, it may be inferred, arbitration remains a
viable method for avoiding costly class actions and might therefore
become the preferred dispute resolution forum of financial institutions.
Even where there is no potential for class actions, lenders may prefer
arbitration because arbitrators are not required to furnish written
opinions explaining their decisions.258 Moreover, most arbitration
awards are private, so lenders may avoid the unwanted negative
publicity that often attends litigation. Thus, lenders need not be fearful
of unfavorable decisions that could encourage other consumers to sue on
similar grounds, or other judges or arbitrators to follow the same
reasoning.259
254. See, e.g., John F.X. Peloso & Stuart M. Samoff, Securities & Commodities Litigation:
Appellate Review of Arbitration Decisions, 213 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1995) ("Although customers and
securities industry personnel alike initially heralded arbitration as a more efficient and less
expensive dispute resolution mechanism for resolving customer claims, the increasing stakes and
complexity of securities arbitrations have resulted in, a process almost as extenuated, costly and
complex as court litigation."). But ef Ellen Joan Pollock, Mediation Firms Alter Legal Landscape,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1993, at BI ("Last year alone, more than 40,000 civil cases that once would
have been handled in the nation's courts were resolved by four major firms that sell quicker, less
costly, less procedurally complex dispute resolution.").
255. Steven W. Bender, Oregon Consumer Protection: Ouriftiing Private Attorneys General
for the Lean Years Ahead, 73 OR. L. REV. 639, 685 n.257 (1994).
256. See Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co., 828 F. Supp. 673,674 (D. Minn. 1993),
appeal dismissed, 15 F.3d 93 (8th Cir. 1994); cf Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596
A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct 1991) (remanding for class certification proceedings in arbitration
of claim under arbitration agreement that is silent on issue of class action).
257. Alexander, supra note 12, at 900.
258. See, e.g., Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA
Construction Arbitrators, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 137, 138-39 (1994) ("there are no transcripts of
arbitration proceedings or reported decisions"); Lynn Katzler, Comment, Should Mandatory Written
Opinions Be Required in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the
Securities Industry, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 151, 166 (1995) ("Before 1990, a party to an arbitration
hearing had difficulty obtaining a written opinion. Under the arbitration rules, a party could obtain
a written decision only if both parties and the arbitrator consented."). Beginning in June 1990, the
NASD, NYSE, AMEX, and AAA approved an amendment allowing parties to obtain written
decisions only in "large and complex cases." See id
259. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 272. Courts, meanwhile, have reasons to favor
arbitration:
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Generally, arbitrators are not required to follow the law, but rather
may reach their decisions based on their notions of what is fair and
just.260 Some states adhere only to the "manifest disregard" standard,
which precludes consideration of "'even gross errors ofjudgment in law'
unless they are apparent on the face of the award. 26' As a practical
matter, that means that consumer arbitration decisions will not often be
reversed in courts because there is no requirement that the arbitrator
explain orjustify the decision "on the face of the award." '62
The use of arbitration clauses becomes especially appealing to lenders
that make loans based not on the consumer's ability to repay, but only
on "underwriting procedures [that] begin and end with an appraisal that
reveals a level of sufficient equity to assure repayment through the
foreclosure process. '  The Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994 prohibits lenders from making such loans, but only where
the lender is engaged in "a pattern or practice" of doing so.2
Consumers attempting to show lender violations of this provision may
have to state their claims in an arbitration proceeding, where the
arbitrator may be partial to the lender that hires him or her repeatedly,
or may be able to ignore the regulations' complexity and instead appeal
to his or her own sense of fairness.2 61 Similarly, state attorneys general
The average suit takes over a year to finish. In Chicago, the backlog for civil cases is
eight years; in New Orleans, courts arc so overcrowded that a judge recently declared
the system unconstitutional-no one, he said, was getting a fair trial. Part of the
problem is due to increases in criminal cases, which take precedence over civil ones.
But the antics of civil lawyers do not help.
Order in the Tort (A Survey of the Legal Profession), EcoNOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 8.
On the other hand, one federal judge indicated that justice can be obtained more efficiently in
the Federal District Court for the District of Maine than is often possible in most arbitration
proceedings. Interview with Judge Gene Carter, U.S. Dist. CL for the Dist. of Me., in Portland, Me.
(Mar. 4, 1997).
260. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 295; see also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (affirming that the parties are bound by all arbitrator decisions not in
"manifest disregard of the law"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 649 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("an arbitrator, unlike a federal judge, has no
institutional obligation to enforce federal legislative policy"); Caribou Bd. of Educ. v. Caribou
Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 212,215 (Me. 1979) (applying the manifest disregard standard).
261. Budnitz, supra note 32, at 295 (quoting Johnson v. Baumgardt, 576 N.E.2d 515, 519
(Ill. App. CL 1991)).
262. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at295 (citing Batten v. Howell, 389 S.E.2d 170, 172 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1990)).
263. Klein, supra note 167, at 134. Apparently, "lenders make these loans based on the value
of the property involved and the advantages they expect to map upon foreclosure." I&. at 133.
264. See id. at 134 (noting that 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) prohibits lenders "from engaging in a
pattern or practice of extending credit to consumers in covered loans based on the consumers'
collateral without regard to the consumers' repayment ability, including the consumers' current and
expected income, current obligations, and employment"). A "patter" exists, for example, wherc
loans repeatedly are made "in low-income neighborhoods with relatively high property values." a
265. Moreover, the fact that decisions are often not reported increases substantially the
plaintiff's burden in attempting to show a pattern or practice.
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and regulatory agencies might be forced to bring consumer grievances
before an arbitration panel.2"
Arbitrators might also ignore state unfair and deceptive acts and
practices statutes in their entirety.26 Even if such statutes are generally
followed, an arbitrator may be persuaded to ignore provisions for
consumer treble damages and attorney's fees.26 In Maine, for example,
consumers may be denied the benefit of treble damages and attorney's
fees imposed against consumer reporting agencies that knowingly or
willfully violate applicable provisions of Maine's Fair Credit Reporting
Act.269 It is at least questionable, however, whether it is appropriate for
lenders and others to be able to avoid the decision of the Maine
Legislature to protect consumers.270
Maine courts have considered the ability of arbitrators to ignore the
law. In 1979, Maine adopted the "manifest disregard" standard.271 The
Maine Law Court, borrowing from a Third Circuit case,2' reasoned that
if an arbitrator's award can
in any rational way be derived from the [arbitration] agreement,
viewed in the light of its language, its context and any other indicia of
the parties' intention, it will be upheld. Only where there is a
manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles
of contract construction and the law of the shop, may a reviewing
court disturb the award.2'
Further, "the agreement must be broadly construed, and all doubts will
usually be resolved in favor of [the arbitrator's] authority."2'7 This
position favoring arbitration has continued to date.275
266. The MOCC is empowered to enforce the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C., Subchapter
I, Parts B (credit transactions), D (credit billing), and E (consumer leases). States may request
exemption from certain classes of transactions, and exemption will be granted if the state rules or
statutes are "substantially similar" to the Federal Truth in Lending Act and Regulations. Once the
exemption has been granted, state agencies may enforce the state statutes and regulations, which
will not be preempted by the Federal TILA. Effective October 1, 1982, Maine was granted such an
exemption. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, §§ 226.29, 29(a)(1), (2), (4) (1996). To what extent the FAA
would preempt enforcement in court by the Attorney General of these state statutory and regulatory
provisions remains to be seen.
267. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 316.
268. See id (citing JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAa AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRAcTIcEs 422,
442-43 (3d ed. 1991)).
269. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1322 (West 1997).
270. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 316. Some lenders, including UCLC, stipulate in their
contracts that the transaction "involves interstate commerce." See supra note 241. This has the
effect of making the FAA applicable to any subsequent dispute between the lender and the borrower.
Still, lenders should not be able to use arbitration as a means of circumventing consumer protection
laws.
271. See Caribou Bd. of Educ. v. Caribou Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 212 (Me. 1979).
272. See Ludwig Honold Mfg. Co. v. Fletcher, 405 F.2d 1123, 1128 (3rd Cir. 1969).
273. Caribou Bd. of Educ. v. Caribou Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d at 215.
274. Id
275. See, e.g., City of Lewiston v. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n Local 785, 629 A.2d 50, 52-53
(Me. 1993) (holding that the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator, for
whose reasoning the parties in fact bargained).
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In searching for reasons to favor arbitration, advocates point to the
cost savings that can be shared by disputants and passed on to all
customers of institutions utilizing arbitration.276  Yet, investor
dissatisfaction with securities arbitration is growing. Complaints focus
on "the adversarialization of the proceedings that proceeds from growing
lawyer participation in the process."2"n The expenses of litigation that
arbitration was designed to avoid now seem to be similarly incurred in
arbitration: "Lawyering practices-extensive, party-conducted pre-trial
discovery, depositions, direct and cross-examination-are redefining the
character of arbitral procedure and justice."278
Finally, credit card customers with limited resources may be forced
to incur costs usually associated with litigation, or worse, discouraged
by high filing fees from pursuing their rights at all.2 ' By signing
agreements that contain arbitration clauses, credit card customers not
only waive their rights to trial by jury but sacrifice the convenience and
efficiency of certain judicial fora, such as the small claims court.
Ironically, these courts were designed to provide a forum for persons
seeking small monetary awards where they might be spared the high cost
associated with litigation in district or superior court; where they would
be able to argue their own case without facing the significant obstacle
created by the use of jargon, rules of evidence, and the lawyers
themselves; and where cases are "heard fast, generally within a month
or two of filing."'28 In contrast, some egregious consumer arbitration
procedures involve excessive filing fees, delays, and complicated,
undisclosed rules."m Credit card customers might not experience a great
savings by resorting to arbitration.2
Consumers should be warned, therefore, that by signing arbitration
agreements, they are waiving the right to litigate in small claims court.
According to one commentator, "There are few other places in America
[outside of small claims court] where the average consumer is as likely
to get a result." 83 Arbitration is certainly more expensive than small
claims litigation. One solution would be to "make customer initiated
276. See Bruce Fein, Keeping Bank Customers Out of Court, TEX. LAW., Oct. 5,1992, at 15;
Brafford, supra note 4, at 357. But cf Budnitz, supra note 32, at 331-32 (noting that the vast
number ofbank failings, mergers., and buyouts suggests that emerging institutions have little if any
incentive to pass such savings on); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, AB.A J.,
Aug. 1996, at 54, 59 (stating that some companies no longer use predispute arbitration clauses
because of the perception that the process nas low, expensive, and unsatisfying).
277. Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1959 n.42.
278. Id at 1959.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
280. When You Need a Lawyer, CONStMER REP., Feb. 1996, at 34-39; see also supra note
30 (explaining Maine Small Claims Court Procedure).
281. See Patterson v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 567 (1993). discussed
infra text accompanying notes 308-14.
282. This holds true unless, ofcourse, one accepts uithout question the idea that the trickle-
down theory of economics results in substantial consumer savings.
283. When You Needa Lawyer, CONSuMEi REP., Feb. 1996, at 36 (quoting Ralph Warner).
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arbitration costs comparable to court filing fees."284 The proponent of
this solution, however, also advocates that only one day's worth of all
other arbitration fees be borne by the lender." 5 Under such a system,
consumers could face the threat of exorbitant charges in the event the
lender employs "lawyering" tactics to delay the arbitration proceedings.
Although it has been proposed that on appeal the non-prevailing party
might be required to pay all arbitration fees,286 this provides little solace
for the would-be small claims litigant.287
The fairness to the consumer of the arbitral process has been
questioned by courts in other states:
Let us assume for a minute that for some reason all the rabbits and all
the foxes decided to enter into a contract for mutual security, one
provision of which were that any disputes arising out of the contract
would be arbitrated by a panel of foxes. Somehow that shocks our
consciences, and it doesn't help the rabbits very much either.288
Similarly, where the panel of arbitrators consists of all rabbits but they
are paid by the foxes, the fairness of the process is at least questionable.
As one commentator reasoned, "'Anytime [sic] you are paying someone
by the hour to decide the rights and liabilities of litigants, and that
person is dependent for future business on maintaining good will with
those who will bring him business, you've got a system that is corrupt
at its core.' 28 9 Lenders appear to have much to gain and consumers
284. Alexander, supra note 12, at 903.
285. See id
286. See id.
287. See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text. Many consumer disputes involve
amounts significant to the consumer but minuscule in comparison with lender assets. A system
imposing costs on the non-prevailing party would be more detrimental to the average consumer,
whose lack of resources would also become a major factor in the decision not to pursue the claim.
288. Board of Educ. of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 443 (W. Va.
1977). A subsequent Oklahoma case used this analogy in discussing a contract that called for a
panel of three RE/Max agents to arbitrate disputes between RE/Max and its customers. See Ditto
v. RE/Max Preferred Properties, Inc., 861 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993), quoted in Wiegand,
supra note 11, at 637. Interestingly, the MOCC is currently investigating a similar occurrence in
Maine. A buyer's broker who signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of benefitting from
the board of realtor's multiple listing service was forced to arbitrate before the board of realtors
when the selling broker refused to split the commission. Meanwhile, the buyers, not parties to the
arbitration agreement, felt the effect of this proceeding when the board of realtors denied relief to
the realtor, who then looked to the buyers for his commission. See Letter from Gordon T. Holmes,
Jr., Peterson Realty of Falmouth, to William N. Lund (Dec. 7, 1996) (on file with the MOCC);
Letter to Arthur Gilbert (on file with the MOCC). Most recently, the Law Court refused to enforce
a similar arbitration provision as against a third party. See Roosa v. Tillotson, 1997 ME 121, 695
A.2d 1196 (holding that purchaser who was not party to the arbitration agreement signed by co-
owner could not be bound by its terms).
289. Richard C. Reuben, The Dark Side of ADR, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 53, 54 (quoting
Joseph A. Yanny); see also supra text accompanying notes 236-48 (discussing inequalities inherent
in the arbitration of disputes between consumers and financial institutions).
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much to lose by entering into predispute arbitration agreements.' 0 The
proposed amendments would serve to notify consumers of what they are
losing.
D. Current Maine Arbitration Lav Allows for the Fair and Effective
Resolution of Labor-Related Disputes, but Provides Inadequate
Safeguards for Consumers
It should be stressed that the proposed amendments to the Maine PLL
would not affect the arbitration of labor disputes. Maine courts have
ruled on numerous arbitration-related disputes in the collective
bargaining context, whereas they have yet to consider the validity of
arbitration contracts between consumers and supervised lenders or
lessors. Accordingly, the proposed amendments would provide the
courts with needed guidance without disturbing the considerable body
of common law rulings on collective bargaining arbitration agreements.
This result is desirable because that body of law currently contains
adequate safeguards. For example, "parties to a dispute cannot be
compelled to submit their controversy to arbitration unless they have
manifested in writing a contractual intent to be bound to do so."' Thus,
in Maine State Employees Ass'n Local 1989 v. Bureau of Employee
Relations,' 2 the Maine Law Court held that employee grievances could
not be heard by the arbitrator where the collective bargaining agreement,
which contained an agreement to arbitrate, had expired393 The court
based this rule "on the principle that unilateral alterations of the
collective bargaining agreement are in contravention of the statutory
duty to bargain in good faith." One may speculate, however, whether
the court could impose a similar duty to bargain in good faith in cases
where lenders unilaterally impose arbitration agreements on consumers,
or where consumers lack bargaining power.295
One commentary indicates that the process of mandatory arbitration
of employment disputes "currently favors employers," and advocates
that the interests of employers and employees, especially nonunion
290. For a convincing expos6 of the numerous ways in which arbitration benefits large
companies at the expense of the "little guy," as well as a lucid summary of applicable Supreme
Court cases, see Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preferencefor BindingArbitration, 74 WASH. U. LQ. 637 (1996).
291. Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779,782 (Me. 1981).
292. 652 A.2d 654 (Me. 1995).
293. See id at 655.
294. Id (quoting Lane v. Bd. of Dirs., Sch. Admin. Distr. No. 8,447 A2d 806, 810 (Me.
1982)).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 193-207 (discussing Badie v. Bank of Am., No. 94-
4916, 1994 WVL 660730 (Cal. Super. Aug. 18, 1994)); see also discussion supra Part 1V.B
(discussing confusion created by inconsistencies betwen arbitration disclosures and the actual
agreements given to Maine consumers today); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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employees, be balanced more fairly.2" Often, it is argued, "[a]rbitrators
may have a strong bias in favor of the employer because the employer
is the one who pays the arbitrator's bills."2' Nonetheless, in the context
of collective bargaining, the process may not be inherently unfair. In
that case, the union representing the employee is a repeat player. It is
perhaps for that reason that employees have sought to compel
arbitration.29 The United States Supreme Court continues to hold that
arbitration is no longer to be disfavored or viewed with distrust.2
Likewise, the Maine Law Court has held that courts, in reviewing
arbitral decisions under the Maine UAA,3to are to "assume arbitrators
[are] faithful to their obligation [not to exceed their powers] absent some
clear showing of a violation of the obligation. ' 0 '
Favorably viewing arbitration in the collective bargaining context
might also be justified by policy considerations. One commentator has
remarked that, in spite of "the prevailing norm that legal rights need not
be adhered to by an arbitrator, labor arbitrators do not systematically
ignore assertions of constitutional rights."'3 2 Rather, a doctrine has
developed in the context of labor arbitration known as "industrial due
process. 3 °3 This doctrine evolved because of the need to foster the
ongoing relationship between the parties and "preserve harmony
between labor and management." 3'
Outside of the collective bargaining context, however, the need to
foster the ongoing relationship between the parties may be absent and
therefore the arbitrator has little incentive to balance the equities fairly.
296. See Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination: Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Disputes (pt. VI), 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1670-71 (1996) [hereinafter
Emp. Disc. Part VI].
297. Nina Schuyler, Expensive Cost Cutting: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses May Cut
Litigation Costs, But at What Expense?, CAL. LAw. Jan. 1995, at 37.
298. See Maine State Employees Ass'n Local 1989 v. Bureau of Employee Relations, 652
A.2d 654, 655 (Me. 1995). Consumers, however, are often at a disadvantage as compared with
employees. Unlike many employees, they lack the added protection of unions, who are "repeat
players" in collective bargaining disputes; because they are "one-shot players," they have no interest
in fostering a continuing relationship with their adversaries. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 321-22.
299. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987) ("It is
difficult to reconcile Wilko's mistrust of the arbitral process with this Court's subsequent decisions
involving the Arbitration Act."); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (noting
that one problem Congress sought to eliminate in passing the FAA was "the old common-law
hostility toward arbitration").
300. See Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938 (West 1980) (allowing courts to vacate awards
"procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;" or where there was "evident partiality by an
arbitrator," the "arbitrators exceeded their powers," or "refused to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause being shown therefor... as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party;" or
where "the award was not made within the time fixed therefor by the agreement").
301. Seppala and Aho-Spear Assocs. v. Westbrook Gardens, 388 A.2d 88, 90 (Me. 1978).
302. Brunet, supra note 13, at 91.
303. See id at 91 n.42 (citations omitted) ("Most arbitrators endeavor to give meaning and
application in labor arbitration to the principles of 'due process' established in the law of
constitutional criminal procedure.").
304. Id. at 118.
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This is true of the "one-time player" who participates in securities
arbitration." 5 Similarly, "the dynamic of an ongoing relationship...
will not spur the arbitrator of a tort accident dispute to create harmony
among the disputants by assuring a fair procedure."3 ' Even in the
collective bargaining context, where the relationship has terminated, the
incentive for achieving fairness may be lacking.307
In the consumer loan context, this lack of fairness becomes more
apparent, for example where the consumer has no choice among lenders
and is required to travel to a distant forum in order to arbitrate the dis-
pute before an arbitrator controlled by the lender. Thus, in Patterson v.
1TT Consumer Financial Corp.,38 the plaintiffs were "individuals of
modest resources who believed they would not have qualified for a con-
ventional loan from a bank."3  Moreover, although the dispute involved
only $2000, the filing fee for a participatory hearing was $850310
Finally, although residents of California at the time the agreement was
signed, their grievances had to be "'resolved by binding arbitration by
the National Arbitration Forum, Minneapolis, Minnesota."' 3 I
Where arbitration clauses are coupled with distant forum clauses, one
might argue thatjudicial enforcement of the agreement constitutes an un-
constitutional denial of due process.3 " Although the court did not reach
this argument in Patterson, it did conclude that the arbitration agreement
was void because it evidenced elements of both substantive and proced-
ural unconscionability?13 The fairness to consumers of arbitration
becomes questionable when one considers the aftermath of Patterson:
After ITT had sold most offices and receivables, and "its credit and loan
volume [had fallen] to nearly zero.] ... National Arbitration Forum, the
305. See Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer Financialservices Litigation, 43 BUS.
LAW. 1081, 1091 (1988).
306. Brunet, supra note 13, at 119.
307. It has been argued that employees should "actually know they are waiving their rights
to ajudicial determination of statutory claims[, and that a] subjective knowledge requirement would
address some of the most troublesome concerns that plague mandatory arbitration." Emp. Disc
Part P, supra note 296, at 1683-84. Proposed solutions, however, require Congressional approval.
See id at 1684 (recommending the codification of a knowing waiver "requirement in the civil rights
statutes themselves"). Until then, Maine courts might continue to enforce arbitration agreements
where the parties "have manifested in writing a contractual intent to be bound." Nisbet v. Faunce,
432 A.2d 779, 782 (Me. 1981); see also supra note 291 and accompanying text.
308. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563,566(1993).
309. 1& at 567.
310. Seeidat566.
311. Id (quoting distant forum clause contained in arbitration agreement litigated before the
court and explaining that the location of the hearing could not be identified for the consumer before
an actual dispute had arisen, and that "the provision on its face suggests that Minnesota would be
the locus for the arbitration").
312. Courts have generally been unwilling to heed such arguments. Nevertheless, in labor
arbitration the "industrial due process" doctrine might be invoked. See Brunct, supra note 13, at
117-20 (advocating the adoption of a related doctrine, "commercial due process," according to
which commercial arbitrators would strive for integrity in the process in order to preserve any
ongoing relationship between commercial disputants).
313. See Patterson v. liT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 567.
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neutral arbitrator named in ITT's mandatory arbitration clause,
reportedly filed for bankruptcy."3 4 This suggests that National Arbitra-
tion Forum depended on ITT as a major source of its business, and
undermines many arguments that commercial arbitrators are unbiased.
Consumer arbitration contracts providing for arbitration in a seriously
inconvenient forum could be invalidated on grounds of public policy.
Distant forum clauses standing alone, however, are not always invali-
dated on grounds of adhesion. Some courts have ignored adhesion
arguments, even when made by passengers who purchased a travel
"package" through a domestic travel agency but did not receive the
tickets containing the finely printed distant forum clause until moments
before boarding the ship in a foreign country.315 Indeed, there are impor-
tant policy reasons for upholding distant forum clauses in certain con-
texts. As the court in Hodes v. Achille Lauro reasoned, "the cruise
attracted passengers from the world over .... The forum selection
clause operated to dispel uncertainty as to where suit could be brought
and assured the appellants they would not face global litigation," especi-
ally where the vessel would be "departing from and returning to Italy."3 6
This reasoning would become strained, however, if applied to
instances where American lenders doing business in all fifty states
attempt to shepherd borrowers into an arbitration forum in one state.
First, consumers could not be said, as they could in Hodes v. Achille
Lauro, to have submitted to the jurisdiction by completing a transaction
in the forum state. Second, the lender's right to "dispel uncertainty"
must be weighed against the "minimum contacts" requirement of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington3t7  and its progeny. By
314. Will Lund, Consumer Law: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts,
ME. LAW. REv., Jan. 18, 1995, at 23; see also Martin v. ITT Commercial Fin, Corp., 876 F. Supp.
824, 825 n.1 (W.D. Va. 1995) ("Shortly [after Plaintiff filed her application to stay arbitration in
1993] Equilaw [a/k/a National Arbitration Forum] filed bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for District of Minnesota"); Wrightson v. Ir Fin. Servs., 617 So. 2d 334, 336 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (reversing trial court's order compelling arbitration because "alleged bias of appellee
Equilaw" presented substantial question as to the validity of the arbitration agreements); liT
Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Wangerin, No. C9-95-163, 1995 WL 434459, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July
25, 1995) (finding no evidence of partiality where "former general counsel for ITT Consumer
Financial Corp .... was a director, officer and shareholder of Equilaw, Inc., the parent company of
the National Arbitration Forum").
315. See, e.g., Hodes v. Achille Lanro, 858 F.2d 905,913 (3d Cir. 1988) ('IT]he Hodeses had
little bargaining power and some jurists have characterized contracts of passage as contracts of
adhesion."). Nevertheless, the court reasoned, "[iln the words of Professor Ellinghaus, 'just because
the contract I signed was proffered to me by Almighty Monopoly Incorporated does not mean that
I may subsequently argue exemption from any or all obligation.' Id. (quoting M.P. Ellinghaus, In
Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 766-67 (1969)) (other citations omitted).
316. Id.
317. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The United States Supreme Court established in International
Shoe the precedent that a business submitted to a forum state's jurisdiction by establishing
minimum sufficient contacts or ties with that state. See Id. at 320. Under an International Shoe
analysis, a lender actually doing business in a state would be required to arbitrate in that forum, just
as a consumer having no contacts with a far-off state should not be compelled to resolve disputes
there, especially where he or she has not subjectively agreed to do so.
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establishing substantial contacts in a state, lenders would be consenting
to at least state enforcement of consumer protection laws.3 " Finally,
even commentators attacking arguments that arbitration clauses may be
invalidated on grounds of adhesion admit that the use of distant forum
clauses in arbitration agreements is problematic; "[a]rbitration should
take place where the transaction occurred."319
With increasing frequency, lenders are relying on arbitration to settle
disputes with their credit card customers.32 Bank of America currently
uses arbitration clauses in its credit card agreements nationwide 21 The
Bank of America contract, however, does not require the arbitration to
be heard in Arizona, although the AAA, in conducting the arbitration,
will apply Arizona law. Still, there is no stipulation that the arbitrator
follow the law, not even Arizona law.3" In Maine, credit card agree-
ments containing arbitration-in-distant-forum clauses are surfacing.3"
Courts in other states have found such clauses to be unconscionable in
certain circumstances.324 At the same time, Professor Budnitz argues
that legislation calling for the prohibition of distant forum clauses as a
"minimum standard" is long-overdue: "Because of limited consumer
resources and relatively small amounts involved in most consumer suits,
the expense and inconvenience of arbitration hearings great distances
from a consumer residence effectively precludes the consumer from
exercising contractual rights to arbitrate."'3" This problem is
exacerbated, of course, where consumers are dissuaded by high filing
fees and complicated procedures from seeking any redress whatsoeverPss
Courts, however, are free to invalidate the agreement to arbitrate on
318. The MOCC has attempted to obtain statements from certain lenders that consumers have
not waived the right to contact that agency or have the agency seek to enfoc consumer protection
laws on their behalf See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
319. Brafford, supra note 4, at 361 (citing Patricia Sturdevant & Dwight Golann, Should
BindingArbitration Clauses Be Prohibited in Consumer Contracts?, DiS. RESOL MAO., Summer
1994, at 6).
320. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 22941 (discussing clauses under examination
of the MOCC).
321. The enforceability of these agreements, at least those imposed on consumers without
their consent, is still being litigated, however. See supra text accompanying notes 193-207
(discussing Badie).
322. See Bank of Arn. Credit Card Agreement (Fall 1996) (on file with the MOCC).
323. See, e.g., Visa Agreement of FNANB (Winter 1997) (on file with the MOCC).
324. See Patterson v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 567 (1993); see also
William H. Blessing, fiT Financial Loses $1.5 Million Jury Verdict In Home Equity &am, 13
NCLC REP Rs, CONSUMER CREDIT AND UsuRY ED., JaniFeb. 1995, at 13 (discussing Williams
v. Aetna Fin. Corp., d.b.a. IT Fin. Servs., 602 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio 1992), and explaining 'arbitration
with National Arbitration Forum would have required [debtor] to pay a S3,000 filing fee, S1,000-
per-day for a hearing, $120 for each document that she filed, and would require she attend the
arbitration hearing at a place selected by NAF"). At the same time, "ITT was not required to
arbitrate if it wanted to foreclose on the customer's real estate." /d
325. Budnitz, supra note 32, at 335 (explaining that Florida has amended its Arbitration Coda
to allow either party to void such a provision).
326. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing concerns of the MOCC).
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grounds of unconscionability.327 This Author's proposed amendments
would provide courts with additional ammunition for the readjustment
of the equities benefitting currently disfavored consumers.
V. OTHER POTENTIAL MEANS OF PROTECTING CONSUMER INTERESTS
A. Existing Proposals
Whether or not the Maine Legislature adopts the amendments to the
Maine PLL proposed in this Comment, the rules for arbitrating consumer
disputes could be changed. Scholars and practitioners have proposed
several such changes. One proposal provides for de novo appeal to a
three-member panel in order to alleviate problems of unfairness and
protect against "'rogue' arbitrators." '328 This solution, however, raises
the same concern as with the original arbitrators: Who is to pay the
members of such a panel and to whom would they be accountable?
Should they be required to report their decisions and follow the law?
Who is to pay their fees? Is a system under which judges are to some
extent accountable to higher courts worth preserving?329 Given that
arbitration has generally been lauded as best serving the purposes of
expediency, certainty, and finality, proposals to incorporate additional
adjudicative layers into the arbitral process, in order to purge it of its ills,
represent the ultimate irony.
Another suggested solution is a call for guarantees of neutrality:
"'Arbitration administrators... should meet minimum requirements for
independence from litigants; they should not depend for more than a
minor portion of their revenue on any single customer.""'33 Again, an
arbitration firm meeting these requirements may depend for its revenue
on a single industry, so that it may be in its interest to gain a favorable
reputation among industry representatives, and the requirement of
having multiple customers becomes moot. From this vantage point, it
becomes difficult to accept the assertion that arbitration clauses "have
proven their value by giving consumers speedy, inexpensive, access to
justice." '331
Some attempts have been made to incorporate arbitration into the
court system, which might resolve problems of fairness and
327. See supra notes 303-04, 314 and accompanying text (discussing lit litigation in
California, Florida, Virginia, Minnesota, and Ohio). Unfortunately, "[m]ost courts are not
persuaded by the 'unconscionable contract of adhesion' argument. The clear trend is to judge the
validity of arbitration clauses in standard form consumer contracts by the same standard used in
other commercial contexts." S. Gale Dick, ADR at the Crossroads, DISP. RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at
55.
328. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 903.
329. Although most judges are not elected and so not per se accountable to the public, the
common law system of reporting and elaborating upon decisions could be said to create de facto
accountability.
330. Brafford, supra note 4, at 361 (quoting Sturdevant & Golann, supra note 319).
331. Brafford, supra note 4, at 362.
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accountability, but may do little to cut costs or reduce court dockets. In
reducing costs, court-annexed arbitration may prove to be more a poison
than a panacea. Studies have been conducted that show that court-
annexed arbitration saves neither public money nor time.3 ADR has in
some places been institutionalized and transformed into the same
adversarial process its creators had sought to avoid 33 Meanwhile, those
who "would value, cherish, fund, encourage and sometimes insist on
adjudication" may indeed find that their complaints fall on deaf ears.3"
Consumers should at least be aware that they are contracting for such a
result. The amendments proposed in this Comment would serve to
generate that understanding.
B. Requiring Arbitrators to Follow Consumer Protection Laws
Arbitrators are required neither to follow the law in reaching
decisions nor to explain the basis of those decisions, so no interpretive
gloss is given to state or federal statutory law. Like the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act,335 the Truth in Lending Act 36 (TILA) was passed by
Congress "specifically to protect a given disadvantaged segment of the
population against documented systematic abuse by an industry." The
complex set of regulations issuing from this often-amended Act may be
difficult for bankers and others to interpret.3 Traditionally, the
judiciary has provided a much-needed gloss on these statutes and
regulations. To the extent that an increasing number of disputes based
on the TIWA will be heard by arbitrators, aid from the judiciary may be
disappearing. 39 Banks rely on reported case law for guidance, and
"[a]rbitration eliminates that source of guidance.""34
332. See Resnick, supra note 222, at 264-65 (citing Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended
Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Talefrom New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 229,230
(1991)).
333. See ici at 262-63 (citations omitted).
334. See id. at263.
335. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1693r (1994).
336. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1994).
337. Budnitz, supra note 32, at 324. Professor Budnitz draws a distinction bctwn private
and public disputes, and argues that it is inappropriate to allow arbitrators, whose mission is to
decide individual controversies, to resolve actions brought under statutes with "social goals beyond
achieving justice among the parties." See Id at 322-26.
338. See Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 130-325, §§ 151-
158, 108 Stat. 2190-2198 (1994); Subtitle B of Title I of the Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L Nos. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1995)). The final regulations implementing these amendments to
TIIA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t, may be found at 12 C.AR. § 226 (1997). See also Klein, supra
note 167 (discussing the legislative history and scope of the 1994 amendment, as well as the lender
abuses the Act was intended to alleviate).
339. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 325 (rLA "cases focus, not on factual disputes, but on
how to interpret and apply the Act and regulations.... TLA] has greatly confused banks.").
340. Id at 326. Predatory lenders, meanwhile, can take advantage of the Act's complexity
or evade its provisions entirely by "rush[ing] the consumer to complete a loan transaction before
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Arbitrators may have little incentive to interpret the law in as careful
a fashion as judges, and may be even less motivated to develop a
coherent theory for building upon common law jurisprudence.34' The
common law may, therefore, evolve at a much slower pace. It may be
argued that because industrial arbitrators are not required to report their
decisions, they are only interpreting the law in a way that will not affect
the outcome in future cases. Thus, they are not adding to any body of
law. That may be warranted in certain cases, such as where the parties
have knowingly waived their rights to ajudicial forum and where there
is no great disparity in bargaining power. 42
Where, on the other hand, Congress or state legislatures have seen fit
to protect consumers who may be unsophisticated or disadvantaged in
terms of bargaining power, it is inappropriate to allow arbitrators to
apply the law differently in like cases, thereby stagnating the evolution
of the common law and inequitably administering justice. In the words
of one commentator:
There can be no moral justification for rewarding one person for his
behavior in certain circumstances and then turning around and
punishing another person for the same conduct in the same situatidn.
To the extent actions are morallyjustified, a moral actor is compelled
to respond in a like manner to persons in comparable situations. As
has been recognized at least since Aristotle, justice requires treating
like persons in a like manner.343
Commercial arbitrators hearing disputes between consumers and
financial institutions thus could be required to rule on the law and report
their decisions, thereby developing a body of arbitration jurisprudence.
Under the current system, arbitrators are not publicly accountable.344 To
the consumer understands the nature of the loan or can obtain advice from a lawyer, friend, or
relative.... [Lenders may also evade TILA by] misdating documents .... Klein, supra note 167,
at 131.
341. For an example of the way Maine judges might build upon common law jurisprudence,
see Eric RL Herlan, Law as Integrity: Chief Justice McKusick's Common Law Jurisprudence, 43
Ma. L. REv. 321 (1991). Judges, acting as interpreters, may "proclaim rights that [had] not been
recognized previously, but only when those rights reflect[ed] the judge's best interpretation of the
guiding principles implicit in the relevant area of law." Id at 326. This entails adding not simply
"an additional holding to the common law pool, but ... an interpretive reconstruction of the
principles involved. -The channeled creativity of Law as Integrity explains well the capacity of the
common law to grow and develop over time." Id. at 329.
342. See discussion supra Part IV.D (discussing Maine cases involving a disparity in
bargaining power).
343. Herlan, supra note 341, at 350.
344. Arbitrators, unlike judges, are employed by the private sector. Judges must justify the
decisions they make in written opinions and are subject to appellate review. They have a public
reputation to protect and are therefore less likely to act simply according to personal biases and
ignore the law. The decisions of arbitrators, on the other hand, are subject to limited review, such
as where there has been a manifest disregard of the law, and arbitrators are not generally required
to follow the law. The contract could stipulate that they do so, of course, but lenders are unlikely
to draft their form contracts in this way, especially where they know that the arbitrator depends on
them, rather than on the one-shot consumer, for repeat business.
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make arbitrators more accountable, the same standard could be applied
as is now applied to judges, who "are not elected legislators, and should
not be in the business of declaring new law based simply on their
personal predilections. 345 That cannot be accomplished, however,
without requiring arbitrators to follow the law or at least justify their
decisions in a reported opinion that reveals more than the final outcome
and the amount of the award.
C. Judicial Responses
1. Introduction
Common law countries have traditionally valued judicial systems
under which judges are expected to develop and adhere to a theory of
common law jurisprudence in order to promote justice. Similarly,
Supreme Court justices have argued in favor of preserving the common
law jurisprudence of the states and against "placing the protection of
rights in an ancillary position among protected values." 6 At the close
of the twentieth century, the words of one commentator ring ominous:
If we are unable to afford some of the social institutions we have, we
should at least be allowed to vote upon which ones we are willing to
expunge from our social life. The institution of arbitration is not
simply being adapted to embrace a larger dispute resolution destiny.
It is being exploited as a tool by which to achieve a surreptitious
reduction of justice services in our society. American society is no
longer characterized by a transcending rule of law, but rather by an
expiring legal culture. Commercial expediency and privatized justice
through arbitration may produce the desired efficiency in the short
run, but what manner of political society will the United States be in
the twenty-first century if, in desperation and despair, we rid it of the
normative function of the law and basic procedural justice? 7
In cases such as Casarotto, we have seen state laws, intended to level
the playing field and protect consumers possessing lesser bargaining
power than the organized industry representatives with whom they
contract, yield to commercial expediency. 8 By refusing to stay certain
345. Herlan, supra note 341, at 349.
346. Carbormeau, supra note 8, at 1966 (discussing Justice Douglas's "prophetic dissent in
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Inc.," 417 U.S. 506, 521 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Justice
Stevens's "poignant critique of the arbitrability of antitrust claims in Mtsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Pynwuth Ina," 473 U.S. 614,660 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and his dissent
in Vinar Segurosy Reaseguros SA. v. M/fSky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 542-56 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); and Justice Thomas's "rigorous and trenchant anal)sis of the Court's inconsistency on
the state-law question" in Alied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995)
(Thomas, J., dissenting), and Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lelan Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 63
(1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
347. Carbonneau, supra note 8, at 1967.
348. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652(1996).
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consumer arbitration proceedings, judges may be permitting the courts,
in the words of Justice Frankfurter, "to be used as instruments of
inequity and injustice. 349
2. Staying Arbitration
As the law currently stands, Maine courts could void arbitration
contracts on the grounds that they are unconscionable or unconstitutional
waivers of rights guaranteed by the Maine Constitution. One Maine
judge has already done so. 350 Examples of unconscionable contracts
include instances where the lender reserves the right to appeal an award
that exceeds a pre-established ceiling or the right to use the courts for
purposes of collecting debts.35' Again, where the consumer is
discouraged altogether from seeking redress, the contract to arbitrate
could be invalidated.352 In such cases, courts could order a stay of
arbitration, whether the Maine UAA or the FAA is applied. 3
349. United States v. Bethlem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942), quoted In Unico v.
Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 411 (N.J. 1967).
350. See Cogliola v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., CV-95-04 (Me. Super. Ct., Lin. Cty., July 26,
1995) (Marsano, J.). Relying on the "sacred tenet of public policy... found in Article 1, Section
20 of the Constitution of Maine," Justice Marsano vacated the arbitration award because the
agreement as written constituted an unconstitutional waiver of the right to trial byjury. Id. slip op.
at 3. The agreement was written so that neither party could appeal awards less than the statutory
minimum for uninsured motorist coverage, whereas awards exceeding that minimum could be
appealed by either party. Reasoning that only the insurance company would want to appeal a higher
award, Justice Marsano invalidated the entire agreement as unconscionable. This was a case of
"first impression in Maine." Auto Policy Arbitration Clause Invalidated, ME. LAW. REV., Sept. 13,
1995, at 5. In deciding that question, Justice Marsano chose to follow the Delaware rather than the
New Jersey approach. See id Compare Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788 (Del. 1992)
(holding that the arbitration agreement between insurer and insured allows insurer escape hatch and
is therefore unconscionable contract of adhesion and void as violative of public policy), with
D'Antonio v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 620 A.2d 1060 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(awarding insurer no more than statutory minimum for underinsured motorist coverage, and finding
that arbitration clause and subsequent award is binding on the parties).
351. See, e.g., ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION, § 13.9.1.1 (3d cd. 1996) (The
Bank of America procedure allowed either party to invoke binding arbitration. This allowed the
bank to continue to file routine collection matters in court, but if the bank was sued, the bank could
require the matter to be turned over to ADR."); id. § 13.9.2.1.1 (explaining that a customer relying
on an arbitration agreement purporting to resolve "financial problems" by ADR was denied any
hearing concerning his financial problems and instead was faced with a default arbitration award
of the alleged loan balance). The MOCC is concerned that consumers might be precluded from
filing counterclaims in collection actions brought against them because they have agreed to arbitrate
all disputes. See supra text accompanying notes 237-39.
352. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
353. Compare ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 5928 (West 1980) ('On application, the court
may stay an arbitration proceeding commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no
agreement to arbitrate."), and Westbrook Sch. Comm. v. Westbrook Teachers Ass'n, 404 A.2d 204,
207 (Me. 1979) (stating that the question of substantive arbitrability is decided by the court), with
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994) (providing that the court determines question of arbitrability where the making
of the arbitration agreement is in issue). See also Stempel, supra note 150, at 1426-27 (proposing
that courts render contracts to arbitrate voidable if not the "product of sufficiently genuine consent,"
a major indicium of which "would be the degree of disclosure of the arbitration provision and its
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Contracts to arbitrate are invalid, revocable, and unenforceable "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. '3 ' Unconscionability was grounds for the revocation of any
contract, even prior to the adoption of this principle in the Uniform
Commercial Code. 55 Courts may therefore invalidate arbitration
agreements where the terms are particularly oppressive and unfair, and
where true consent is lacking.
Agreements to arbitrate disputes between merchants and consumers
that are coupled with distant forum clauses could be invalidated as
unconscionable by Maine courts 56 In a recent California case, the
inconvenience of the forum to consumers of modest means was a major
factor in the decision to invalidate an arbitration agreement.357 The
California Court of Appeal viewed the procedure as "designed to
discourage borrowers from responding at all."3 8  The arbitration
contract was therefore held to be unenforceable on grounds of
unconscionability.359 Maine courts could follow this reasoning in
staying arbitration in situations where the underlying agreement provides
for such unconscionably expensive access to the arbitral forum.
Although Maine courts look favorably upon arbitration, they have
invoked a public policy exception on occasion: "A court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's
impact on the resisting party's knowledge or access to knowledge of the differences between
arbitration and its alternative forums"). Stempel outlines the history of the doctrine of
unconscionability and suggests that courts will allow parties to avoid contracts on grounds of
unconscionability where both lack of choice and unreasonable terms are in evidence. See I at
1428-33.
354. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995); see also M . REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5927 (West 1980)
(operative provision of Maine UAA).
355. See Stempel, s ra note 150, at 1430 n.252 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 and Campbell Soup
Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d. Cir. 1948)).
356. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at902 (advising drafters ofADR clauses to provide
for arbitration in county of customer's residence, in order to avoid "closer scrutiny and possible
non-enforcement of arbitration") (citation omitted).
357. See Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566 (1993); see also
supra text accompanying notes 308-14.
358. See Patterson v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 566 (finding that the
National Arbitration Forum's rules and procedures came "perilously close" to denying the borrower
a "'fair opportunity to present his position'") (citation omitted).
359. See id at 567. It seems unconscionable for a lender to extend credit without regard for
the borrower's ability to repay. See, eg., Klein, supra note 167, at 133-34 (describing how
predatory lenders sometimes close their eyes to a borrower's inability to pay in order to reap the
rewards of foreclosure). Where loans are extended in violation ofthe Home Omcrship and Equity
Protection Act of 1994, courts could refuse to enforce the accompanying arbitration agreements on
grounds ofunconscionability. See, e.g., Green, supra note 14, at 119 (proposing. Interalla, that
courts should look at the "totality of the circumstances" to see "whether the individual knowingly
and voluntarily consented to waiver of his substantial rights"). But of Stempel, supra note 150, at
1415 (explaining that although some argue that lack of choice alone makes a contract provision
unconscionable, most courts rightly reject this argument). Professor Stempel does, however,
recommend that courts require a "higher level of consent" before consumers will be deemed to have
waived the right to litigate. See it at 1432-33 & n.261.
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construction of a contract that is bargained for, ... [but if] the award
contravenes public policy we will disturb the award."36 To date, this
exception has only been invoked in disputes involving public employers
and employees.36 The Maine Law Court first recognized the exception
in 1989, but after a review of the record, found no public policy
violation.362 Borrowing from an earlier Massachusetts decision, the
court explained the limited scope of the exception: "[A]n arbitrator
exceeds his power when the award contravenes public policy requiring
conduct 'beyond that which [a] public employer may bind itself or allow
itself to be bound."'363 Although the court discussed the exception
subsequently,"s in no case has it found a public policy to have actually
been violated. The Supreme Court, however, has articulated a broader
public policy exception:
As with any contract, .. .a court may not enforce a collective-
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy [and] the
question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the
courts.... Such a public policy, however,.., is to be ascertained "by
reference to the laws and legal precedents and. not from general
considerations of supposed public interests.""36
Maine courts could rely on yet another source of law in deciding
whether they should enforce consumer agreements to arbitrate. Article
I, section 19 of the Maine Constitution provides that "[e]very person...
shall have remedy by due course of law; and right and justice shall be
administeredfreely and without sale .... ."" Maine courts could refuse
to enforce those consumer arbitration contracts that provide for
exorbitant filing fees, complicated and poorly disclosed procedures, or
hearings in seriously inconvenient fora, by invoking the state
360. City of Lewiston v. Lewiston Firefighters Ass'n Local 785, 629 A.2d 50, 52-53 (Me.
1993) (quoting Dep't of Transp. v. Maine State Employees Ass'n Local 1989, 606 A.2d 775, 777
(Me. 1992)).
361. See, e.g., Bureau of Maine State Police v. Pratt, 568 A.2d 501 (Me. 1989).
362. See id at 505-06.
363. Dep't of Transp. v. Maine State Employees Ass'n Local 1989,606 A.2d at 777 (quoting
Local 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 467 N.E.2d 87, 91
(Mass. 1984)).
364. See id.
365. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of the United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., 461 U.S. 757,766(1983) (quoting Muschany v. United States,
324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)) (internal citations omitted).
366. ME. CONST. art. I, § 19 (emphasis added). At least 36 other states have similar
provisions. See Cary L. Fleisher, Comment, Article 1, Section 19 of the Maine Constitution: The
Forgotten Mandate, 21 ME. L. REv. 83, 83 n.l (1969) (collecting state constitutions with similar
provisions). This largely ignored constitutional provision has roots in the Magna Charta. See Id.
at 84-85. The language of the Magna Charta is strikingly similar to that in the Maine Constitution,
and is relevant to arbitration agreements: "We will sell to no man.... either justice or right."
Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225), quoted in Fleisher, supra, at 84-85.
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constitution's guarantee of a remedy for injury by the course of the law,
"freely and without sale."367
It has been argued that Article I, section 19 of the Maine Constitution
creates a "presumption for relief," which defendants can overcome only
by establishing "competing negatives" or interests. 68 Courts, holding a
"judicial thumb on the [consumers'] side of the scale, ' 36' would then
weigh in the balance interests of public policy, and '"such qualifications
and limitations as other principles of law equally sound and important
impose upon it."'37  Courts would thus uphold arbitration contracts that
on their face have the effect of neither violating nor circumventing
existing consumer protection laws, as long as there are no grounds for
a finding of unconscionability such as that found in Patterson.3 "
Conversely, where defendants fail to overcome the Maine Constitution's
presumption for relief without sale, the contract would not be enforced.
3. Vacating Awards
Courts may also vacate arbitration awards under both the UAA and
the FAA.3  Arguments that agreements to arbitrate constitute
unconstitutional waivers of substantive rights have, however, been
relatively unsuccessful in persuading both the Supreme Court and Maine
courts to stay arbitration proceedings or vacate awards.?' Consumers
seeking to vacate arbitration awards could, however, look to the
language of both the FAA and the UAA to buttress their due process
arguments. Both statutes allow courts to vacate awards procured by
367. See ME. CONST. art. , § 19; see also Patterson v. fIT Consuner Fin. Corp, 18 Cal Rptr.
2d 563, 567 (1993) (holding that costs imposed on consumer seeking redress constituted grounds
for finding ofunconscionability).
368. See Fleisher, supra note 366, at 107-08.
369. Id at 107.
370. Id (quoting Gating v. Fraser, 76 Me. 37,41 (1884)).
371. See supra notes 308-14 and accompanying text.
372. Compare 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1995) (stating that arbitration awards may be vacated "where
the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means," and upon showing "of any...
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced"), with ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 5938 (West 1980) ([Mhe court shall vacate an award wher... the award was procured
by corruption, fraud or other undue means [or] (t]here was evident... misconduct prejudicing the
rights of any party.").
373. See, eg., Edgecomb v. Town of Limestone, 538 A.2d 767,770 (ie. 1988) (holding that
because a complaining police officer did not avail himself'ofstatutory review procedures, he cannot
later assert due process violation affecting property interest); Anderson v. Elliott, 555 A.2d 1042,
1049 (Me. 1989) (holding that a court may exercise power to regulate the bar by requiring a
simplified, expeditious, and fair way of resolving fee disputes between attorney and client without
violating the attorney's right to trial byjury). But cf Buckminster v. Acadia Village Resort, Inc.,
565 A.2d 313, 316 (Me. 1989) (holding that an arbitration clause did not foreclose ability of
architect to perfect statutory mechanic's lien). See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20,26 (1991) (recognizing that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by [a] statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chlsler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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"undue means."374 One commentator suggests that practitioners could
base their due process arguments on this phrase.375 In doing so, they
would argue that procedural unfairness is grounds for vacating
arbitration awards granted under either the FAA or the UAA. Although
this may be an "uphill battle," '376 due to the policy of Maine and federal
courts favoring arbitration, in particularly egregious cases, arguments of
procedural unfairness are not without merit.
In Maine, awards have been vacated where the arbitrator has
exceeded his authority or where the arbitration proceeded from an
agreement later found by the court to be non-existent or invalid.377
Maine has not seen, however, a large number of cases seeking vacation
of consumer arbitration awards.37 Despite the millions of customers
signing consumer arbitration agreements, relatively few Maine
consumers appear before arbitration panels. It may be that they have no
disputes. More likely, however, is the possibility that substantial costs,
complicated procedures, reports of arbitrator bias, or perhaps fear of the
unknown have persuaded them to ignore their claims. Under these
circumstances, the Maine Law Court could adopt a policy that
scrutinizes certain consumer arbitration agreements on grounds of
procedural unfairness or "undue means." Until arbitration proceedings
are more fully reported, however, this tack may prove difficult.379
The FAA also provides for vacation of awards where the "rights" of
the parties were "prejudiced.""38 Drafters of the FAA may have intended
to preserve constitutional rights by including this section.3 s' The Maine
UAA contains similar language.382 Maine courts could, therefore, look
to the language of either the FAA or the UAA for authority to vacate
awards on grounds of substantive unconscionability where "rights" of
the parties have been prejudiced. This would help justify the
constitutional reasoning espoused in Cogliola v. Royal Globe Insurance
374. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938(1)(A) (West 1980).
375. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 114-15.
376. Seei at ll5.
377. See, e.g., Pelletier & Flanagan, Inc. v. Maine Court Facilities Auth., 673 A.2d 213, 216
(Me. 1996) (vacating award where opposing party preserved objection that there was no valid
agreement to arbitrate); Buckminster v. Acadia Village Resort, Inc., 565 A.2d 313, 314 (Me. 1989)
(vacating judgment where arbitration agreement did not contain express waiver of party's statutory
right to file mechanic's lien).
378. Most cases involve collective bargaining agreements or disputes between contractors and
subcontractors. Clauses calling for arbitration of claims under uninsured motorist clauses of
insurance policies are specifically exempted from the Maine UAA. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 5948 (West 1980).
379. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 115.
380. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1995); see also Brunet, supra note 13, at 115-17 (arguing that
the inclusion of this concept is evidence that Congress intended to provide a mechanism for the
preservation of constitutional rights).
381. See Brunet supra note 13, at 116 (arguing that Julius Cohen envisioned arbitration that
included a process for appeals in order to preserve substantial rights of the parties).
382. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 5938(1)(B) (West 1988) ("The court shall vacate an
award where... [t]here was ... misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party.").
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Co.383 This approach would avoid preemption by the FAA in that it
relies on both the words of the statute itself and Maine organic law, such
as the right of redress for injuries and the right to trial byjury3"
Although courts until now have been hesitant to review arbitral
awardss the time may have come for them to take a second look. With
the advent of arbitration in areas of consumer loans and purchases,
citizens are unlikely to have "intentionally or intelligently" waived their
constitutional rights?' Where they are borrowing from a lender of last
resort, borrowers arguably have no real choice, and may lack the means
to seek counsel informing them of viable alternatives to either the lender
or the arbitration the lender requires. These policy considerations might
justify a finding of unconscionability sufficient to allow Maine courts to
invoke a public policy exception.
D. Legislative Action
Congress " could amend the FAA in order to prevent the preemption
of state disclosure laws, and thereby dispel any uncertainty about the
conflict between the FAA and federal disclosure statutes?"c This would
clarify that Congress does not intend the FAA to preempt state
legislation enacted to protect consumers from lenders violating state
disclosure requirements. 89
383. CV-95-04 (Me. Super. Ct., Lin. Cty., July 26, 1995) (Marsano, J.); see supra note 350
and accompanying text.
384. See ME. CONST. art. I, §§ 19-20.
385. See Brunet, supra note 13, at 119.
386. See id
387. The following discussion is applicable to both state and federal legislative action, but
reference will be made only to Congress because most consumer loan disputes would fall under the
FAA, and Congressional action would therefore be more comprehensive. The arguments apply,
however, with equal weight to both the FAA and the Maine UAA.
388. Most consumer loan transactions can easily be shown to involve interstate commerce,
which means that the FAA will apply at least where loan documents are drafted to include
arbitration clauses. Assuredly, the number of such transactions has increased substantially since
1925, when the FAA was drafted. See. e.g., Nationwide Banking andlnsurance Activities, 1993:
Oversight Hearings on Interstate Banking and Branching (P.L 102-242) Before the Senae Comin.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Hon. Frank N. Nevnan,
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance, United States Treasury), available In 1993 WL 747903
(explaining how financial markets, once locally controlled, have evolved dramatically so that banks
are now funded across state and national boundaries and extend credit beyond in-state markets);
Bank Supervision, 1997: Hearings on the Future ofBank Examination and SupervLsion Before the
Subcomn. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and
Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Andrew C. Hove, Jr., Acting Chairman of the
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.), available in 1997 WL 621761 (indicating that in the past thirteen years,
the percentage of the nation's banking assets controlled by multi-state organizations has increased
from 33% to over 66%). Amendments to the FAA are thus essential to fulfill needs that simply did
not exist seventy years ago.
389. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 336. Professor Budnitz notes further "Congress should
make it clear that it does not intend the FAA to take from state legislatures the authority to exempt
consumer transactions from arbitration." Id
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First, arbitrators could be required to follow the law in consumer
disputes of a certain class, such as those covered under the Maine
PLL.3  For example, New Jersey requires "a 'reasoned' decision which
includes findings of fact and determinations of law.""39 Arbitrators
would thus be required to explain, at least minimally, the basis of
decisions arising from consumer disputes. Related legislation could
require training of arbitrators in consumer protection.3" On the federal
level, this would involve many consumer protection statutes, such as the
Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934, and the TILA. In Maine,
arbitrators would need training under Maine's consumer credit laws393
and Unfair Trade Practices Act. 94
Second, provision could be made for appeal to a judicial forum in
cases where the arbitrator resolving a consumer-lender dispute has failed
to apply the law correctly.395 Alternatively, arbitration rules could allow
the decision to be appealed within the arbitration system.396 The latter
approach, however, may present the same problems of accountability
and bias encountered with present arbitration rules, and undermine
arbitration's goal of expediency.397 It is more appropriate that actions
brought by consumers be appealed to a judicial tribunal, because
consumers' grievances may be classified as "public" and are often
regulated under state police powers 9 s
Third, the privacy of arbitration proceedings could be limited to the
identity of the complaining consumer. In this way, certain lenders would
be motivated by potentially negative publicity to make amends for, and
avoid in the future, truly egregious conduct.39 At the same time,
publication of the arbitration proceedings and final outcomes would
encourage other lenders to resist the temptation to engage in similar
behavior, such as the violation of disclosure statutes. Pressure on the
390. See id. at 336-37.
391. Id. at 338 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-12 (West 1962)).
392. See id.
393. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A §§ 1-101 to 11-121 (West 1997) (Maine
Consumer Credit Code); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1311-1329 (West 1997) (Fair Credit
Reporting Act); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4595-4598 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997) (Fair
Credit Extension Subchapter of Maine Human Rights Act); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1121-
1126 (West 1997) (Plain Language Law); ME. REV. SAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 11001-11054 (West 1988
& Supp. 1996-1997) (Maine Fair Debt Collection Practices Act). This list is not all-inclusive, but
the volume and complexity of these consumer protection laws alone underscores the need for
arbitrator education.
394. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 205-A to 214 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996-1997).
395. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 338 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-13(c)(5) (West
1962)).
396. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 902-03.
397. See discussion supra Part IV.
398. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 322-23 (arguing that the arbitral forum is not the
appropriate place to resolve disputes arising from alleged violations of consumer-protective statutes,
which are intended to preserve "public" rights).
399. Although one might argue that frivolous proceedings might harm lenders, publishing the
underlying decision would eliminate the possibility of undue prejudice adversely affecting lenders.
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arbitrator to apply these statutes fairly would increase, and perhaps
counteract any existing bias in favor of the lender. Consumers, even if
they do not prevail, will have consented to the proceedings and at least
leave with a sense that the process was conducted fairly.400
Finally, Congress should make it clear that the FAA should not be
construed to preempt state laws designed to protect those consumers
"who, without these laws, would not be in a position to protect
themselves."4 1 Of course, if all parties knowingly and voluntarily
consent to the use of ADR, "true justice will have been achieved."'
Note, however, that "[j]ustice does not follow from a situation where
consumers are forced to adhere to an arbitral forum and process that they
would not have chosen once the dispute arose.""0 3 Congress could
rectify this problem by amending the FAA to specify that it is to be
applicable only in federal court.4° Meanwhile, amendments to the
Maine UAA and PLL could be drafted to avoid preemption under recent
Supreme Court case law.40 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumer protection laws were not drafted to enable lenders to "opt-
out" of disclosure requirements. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court has effectively sanctioned such a process.4 " The Maine
PLL can be amended to withstand preemption, and yet remain within the
parameters created by these decisions, by providing for state
enforcement of new disclosure laws rather than the invalidation of
arbitration agreements. Meanwhile, the Maine State Bar Association,
Office of Consumer Credit Regulation, or Bureau of Banking should
publish articles or use other fora to educate consumers.4 " Lenders
400. See, e.g., Green, supra note 14, at 119 (stating that parties coerced into adhesion
agreements that are enforced by courts without hesitation interpret the process as unfair). Green
agrees with Justice Marshall that the "'governing principle of a humane society and a good legal
system... [is to] recognize the worth and importance of every person... [and] be perceived by all
the people as providing equal justice.'" I/ (quoting statements by Justice Thurgood Marshall at
the Eighth Conference on the Law of the World, 1977, Mr. Justice Marshall Lives on His Words,
NAT'L LJ. Feb. 8, 1993, at 8) (alterations and emphasis in original).
401. Id
402. I1
403. Id at 119-20.
404. See id at 118 (proposing Congressional amendments to the FAA).
405. See generallyAllied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) and Doctor'
Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996), both discussed spra Part ILB.3, 4.
406. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 277-81.
407. Professor Budnitz proposes that industry representatives, in spite of complaints about
the administrative costs, should be responsible for consumer education. See Budnitz, supra note
32, at 334. Consumer education is also to be desired by proponents of alternative dispute
resolution, who should be "critical of certain businesses or industries that abuse arbitration and
coerce consumers to agree to it." Green, supra note 14, at 118. Industry representatives could also
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wishing to refer future consumer disputes to arbitration could also be
required to publicize the effects of arbitration on consumer rights."'
Freedom of contract remains essential both to the current economic
system and to the preservation ofjustice.4 °9 Society also needs certain
"traffic rules," including rules for the enforcement of arbitration
-agreements.10 Still, those rules should also protect the "helpless,
ignorant buyer" whose "consent is doubly unreal-the buyer [or
borrower who] has no real choice ... and ...neither knows nor
understands what he is signing."" Only those consumers who
knowingly contract to resolve future disputes before an arbitrator should
be obliged to do so. Without informed consent, there can be no
contract.41 2 Disclosure statutes ensure that contracts are consensually
created. Lenders who violate those statutes should not be able to seek
refuge in arbitration by exploiting recent Supreme Court holdings to the
detriment of some consumers.
The amendments to the Maine PLL proposed in this Comment would
withstand preemption by the FAA and preserve consumers'
constitutional rights to a jury and a fair trial. Consumers wishing to
waive those rights should at least know they are doing so. The specific
costs and procedures should also be clearly disclosed in advance.
Currently, consumers are vulnerable to arbitrators, who, by neglecting
to follow the law, demonstrate that a sort of 'judicial" intervention is
alive and well in the nineties. Judge Learned Hand would have
denounced such a practice as anti-democratic:
engage in broad-based educational campaigns to counter the unfair advantage some of their
competitors may gain by cutting administrative comers.
408. Certain lenders may not wish to participate in such a campaign and may indeed exert
efforts to promote arbitration. See Budnitz, supra note 32, at 332. If all lenders using arbitration
were required to publicize, the playing field between those who do and those who do not might be
levelled.
409. "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
410. See LAwRENcEM. FRIEDMAN, THEREPUBLICOFCHOICE 62 (1990). In post-industrial
society, we are faced with "a situation of weird duality," in which individuality and free choice are
valued and expected, but where external controls are nonetheless imposed upon us by strangers. See
id at 72-73. Because society has become technologically complex, a vast network of"traffic rules"
is needed to provide "orderly access to scarce resources." Id at 62. Still, in order for individuality
to survive, we must recall that the essence of contract is free choice, and "a social order based on
contract is a social order which exalts the individual and his options above all else." Id. at 81.
Analyzed in this way, the amendments proposed in this Comment come to be seen as traffic rules
enacted to ensure that externally-created controls do not extinguish individuality and free choice.
411. Id. at 82 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965)).
412. Even if one applies an objective theory of contract to consumer arbitration agreements,
one must admit that the "external manifestation[s] of mutual assent" required under that standard
of contract formation are premised upon internal consent. 13 SAMuEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E.
JAEGER, ATREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1536 (3d ed. 1970), cited in GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 43 (1974).
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ARBITRATIONDISCLOSURE
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I
assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus
of living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in
the direction of public affairs. Of course I know how illusory would
be the belief that my vote determined anything;, but nevertheless when
I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all
engaged in a common venture.4t 3
Maine consumers who consent to arbitration without adequate
warning and information merit the protection that their elected
representatives are able to provide. Unless adequate steps are taken to
protect consumer interests, the uninformed will continue to waive their
rights to judicial review-that "old and powerful weapon in courts of the
United States" 4 4-without becoming aware of what they have lost until
it is too late. The statutory amendments proposed in this Comment
would ensure that consumers understand the nature of the process for
which they are bargaining and that an actual bargain takes place.
Andrew R. Sarapas
413. LEARNm HAND, THnEBILL OF PGHTS 73-74 (1958), quoted In GUNTHEP, szpra note 16,
at 659.
414. FR.EDM N, supra note 410, at 22.
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